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D A R R E N  L E N A R D  H U T C H I N S O N  
Who Locked Us Up? Examining the Social Meaning of 
Black Punitiveness 
Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America 
B Y  J A M E S  F O R M A N ,  J R .  
F A R R A R ,  S T R A U S  A N D  G I R O U X ,  2 0 1 7  
abstract.  Mass incarceration has received extensive analysis in scholarly and political de-
bates. Beginning in the 1970s, states and the federal government adopted tougher sentencing and 
police practices that responded to rising punitive sentiment among the general public. Many schol-
ars have argued that U.S. criminal law and enforcement subordinate people of color by denying 
them political, social, and economic well-being. The harmful and disparate racial impact of U.S. 
crime policy mirrors historical patterns that emerged during slavery, Reconstruction, and Jim 
Crow. In his Pulitzer Prize-winning book Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black 
America, James Forman, Jr. demonstrates that many blacks supported aggressive anticrime policies 
that gave rise to mass incarceration. On the surface, this observation potentially complicates argu-
ments that conceive of U.S. criminal law and enforcement as manifestations of white supremacist 
political power. Forman’s failure to provide a comprehensive analysis of the racist dimensions of 
punitive sentiment makes his research subject to such an interpretation. A deeper analysis, how-
ever, reconciles Forman’s research with antiracist accounts of U.S. crime policy. In particular, social 
psychology literature on implicit bias, social dominance orientation, and right-wing authoritari-
anism provides a helpful context for situating black punitive sentiment within antisubordination 
criminal law theory. These psychological concepts could link punitiveness among blacks with out-
group favoritism and in-group stigma that derive from structural inequality and antiblack social 
stigma. The social psychology of punitive sentiment, resilience of white supremacy, and conserva-
tive political ideology will likely present substantial barriers to the merciful approach to criminality 
that Forman proposes. 
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introduction 
The precipitous rise of incarceration in the United States has become a cen-
tral focus of contemporary political and legal debates.
1
 In the 1970s, state and 
federal governments began enacting tough criminal law reforms, including the 
elimination of parole, mandatory minimum sentences, and enhanced sentences 
for certain offenders, including recidivists.
2
 Prosecutors also wielded their broad 
discretion to bring more serious charges against the average defendant and se-
cure longer sentences.
3
 The impact of these punitive measures has been quite 
stark. Over two million Americans are now incarcerated in federal, state, and 
local penal institutions,
4
 and the rate of incarceration has increased 400 percent 
over the last forty years.
5
 Presently, the United States has the highest incarcera-
tion rate of all developed nations.
6
 
Commentators attribute these exacting anticrime policies that caused mass 
incarceration to numerous factors, including sensationalized media coverage of 
crimes
7
 and public opinion favoring stricter punishment.
8
 Many scholars also 
contend that mass incarceration contributed to structural racial inequality.
9
 Cit-
ing the disparate and detrimental impact of aggressive policing and incarceration 
 
1. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 60 (rev. ed. 2012) (discussing incarceration statistics); JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING 
UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 7 (2017) (same). 
2. Traci Schlesinger, The Failure of Race Neutral Policies: How Mandatory Terms and Sentencing 
Enhancements Contribute to Mass Racialized Incarceration, 57 CRIME & DELINQ. 56 (2011) (dis-
cussing enhancements and mandatory terms); Jeffrey Lin, Parole Revocation in the Era of Mass 
Incarceration, 4 SOC. COMPASS 999 (2010) (discussing the move to determinate sentencing 
and ﬁnding that revocation of parole has contributed to a larger prison population). 
3. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO 
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 127-59 (2017) (discussing prosecutorial discretion and its contribution 
to mass incarceration). 
4. Mirko Bagaric, Sandeep Gopalan & Marissa R. Florio, A Principled Strategy for Addressing the 
Incarceration Crisis: Redeﬁning Excessive Imprisonment as a Human Rights Abuse, 38 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1663, 1670 (2017). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Jared S. Rosenberger & Valerie J. Callanan, The Inﬂuence of Media on Penal Attitudes, 36 CRIM. 
JUST. REV. 435 (2011) (linking punitive attitudes and time spent watching media coverage of 
crime). 
8. Peter K. Enns, The Public’s Increasing Punitiveness and Its Inﬂuence on Mass Incarceration in the 
United States, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 857 (2014) (examining links among public punitiveness, mass 
incarceration, and congressional responses to crime). 
9. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 190-200 (discussing parallels between historical and contem-
porary racial inequality created by criminal law); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral 
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on communities of color, these scholars argue that contemporary criminal law 
and enforcement
10
 operate as mechanisms of racial subordination. Studies indi-
cate that implicit and overt racism among jurors, voters, lawmakers, judges, 
prosecutors, police, and probation officers causes some of the racial inequities 
related to criminal law and enforcement.
11
 Moreover, while poverty explains 
some racial disparities associated with policing and incarceration,
12
 studies that 
control for socioeconomic status ﬁnd that race inﬂuences length of sentence
13
 
 
Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1298-1300 
(2004) (arguing that mass incarceration facilitates racial subordination); see also Darren Le-
nard Hutchinson, “Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position”: Social Dominance, Implicit 
Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 81-84 (2014) (arguing that contem-
porary criminal law and enforcement subordinate persons of color). 
10. In this Article, I use “criminal law and enforcement” to describe state and federal penal law 
and agencies created to prevent and punish criminal activity or to rehabilitate criminals. Thus, 
the term includes police departments, other law-enforcement agencies, judges, courts, pros-
ecutors, defense attorneys, and correctional institutions. Most scholars use the term “criminal 
justice system” for the same deﬁnitional purpose. As other scholars have observed, however, 
that term, though widely utilized, is somewhat problematic. First, it suggests that a uniform 
“system” of substantive criminal law and enforcement exists. However, numerous institu-
tional and individual decisions—often uncoordinated—shape the administration of criminal 
law. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 MICH. L. 
REV. 187, 195 (2017). Moreover, referring to criminal law and enforcement as comprising a 
system of “justice” can seem problematic in light of the racial and class disparities that pervade 
it. See, e.g., SUSAN EHRLICH MARTIN & NANCY C. JURIK, DOING JUSTICE, DOING GENDER: 
WOMEN IN LEGAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE OCCUPATIONS 3 (2d ed. 2017). To avoid these diffi-
culties, this Article uses “criminal law and enforcement” where other scholars might use 
“criminal justice system.” 
11. See, e.g., Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 
2183 (2013) (“African Americans, who are disproportionately poor, are the target of explicit 
and implicit bias by key actors in the criminal justice system, including police, prosecutors, 
and judges.” (footnotes omitted)); Hutchinson, supra note 9, at 57-72 (discussing research 
regarding implicit bias and racial disparities within criminal law and enforcement). 
12. See, e.g., Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman & Norman Loayza, Inequality and Violent Crime, 
45 J.L. & ECON. 1, 25 (2002) (examining crime data from multiple countries and ﬁnding that 
poverty alleviation leads to a reduction in homicides and violent crime); Richard H. McAd-
ams, Economic Costs of Inequality, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 27-37 (discussing research linking 
poverty and crime). 
13. See David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the 
U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 306 (2001) (ﬁnding “that blacks and Hispanics are 
much less likely than whites to be assigned no prison term when that is an option,” and noting 
that the results are “mitigated, but remain statistically signiﬁcant” after controlling for nu-
merous relevant variables). Other studies reach both similar and different results. See, e.g., id. 
at 286 (“Many analyses concluded that sentencing exhibits racial discrimination, while others 
argued that if the offense severity and criminal history were controlled for appropriately, there 
was little or no evidence for sentencing differences.”). 
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and defendants’ access to pretrial diversion.
14
 Furthermore, because historical 
and ongoing racism contributes to high rates of poverty among people of color,
15
 
class-based explanations for racial inequality still implicate racial discrimina-
tion.
16
 
Today, the contention that criminal law and enforcement subordinate people 
of color and reinforce racial hierarchy is widely accepted in the academic litera-
ture.
17
 Perhaps the most prominent antisubordination criminal law scholar is 
Michelle Alexander, whose research links contemporary racial hierarchies seen 
in U.S. crime policy with historical practices that emerged during slavery, Re-
construction, and the Jim Crow era.
18
 Before Alexander published her landmark 
work, however, scholars such as Dorothy Roberts had already observed that U.S. 
 
14. See Traci Schlesinger, Racial Disparities in Pretrial Diversion: An Analysis of Outcomes Among 
Men Charged with Felonies and Processed in State Courts, 3 RACE & JUST. 210 (2013) (ﬁnding that 
black and Latino defendants are less likely than white defendants to receive pretrial diversion). 
15. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND 
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (linking racism and poverty). 
16. See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey, Getting Away with Murder: Segregation and Violent Crime in Urban 
America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1210 (1995) (“Because crime and violence are strongly corre-
lated with income deprivation, any social process that concentrates poverty also concentrates 
crime and violence to create an ecological niche characterized by a high risk of physical injury, 
violent death, and criminal victimization.”). 
17. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 190-200 (discussing parallels between historical and contempo-
rary racial inequality created by criminal law); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating 
Crimmigration, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1457, 1485 (2013) (“With the legitimacy of ostensibly race-
neutral criminal law and procedure, lawmakers reproduced the racial hierarchies of decades 
past.”); Hutchinson, supra note 9, at 81-84 (arguing that contemporary criminal law and en-
forcement subordinate persons of color); Allegra M. McLeod, Confronting the Carceral State, 
104 GEO. L.J. 1405, 1407 (2016) (“Criminal law enforcement in the United States has long 
served as a means of racial discipline and a manner of enforcing racial subordination—shaping 
for more than a century the tolerated brutality in criminal law enforcement and rendering 
U.S. carceral practices particularly severe across the board.”); Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abo-
lition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1185-1199 (2015) (analyzing historical and 
contemporary racial subordination imposed by the U.S. penal state); Priscilla A. Owen, Pun-
ishing Pregnancy: Race, Incarceration, and the Shackling of Pregnant Prisoners, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 
1239, 1260 (2012) (“[T]he constructs that initially attached to Black women through an ideo-
logical ediﬁce that justiﬁed enslavement and the racial domination through the use of the 
criminal law became normalized within the punishment system over time.”); Roberts, supra 
note 9, at 1298-1300 (arguing that mass incarceration facilitates racial subordination); Jim 
Sidanius, Michael Mitchell, Hillary Haley & Carlos David Navarrete, Support for Harsh Crim-
inal Sanctions and Criminal Justice Beliefs: A Social Dominance Perspective, 19 SOC. JUST. RES. 
433, 445 (2006) (“[T]he empirical data are consistent with the notion that support for severe 
criminal sanctions is, at least in part, motivated by the desire to establish and maintain group-
based social hierarchy, and is additionally rationalized or justiﬁed in terms of moral norms 
(e.g., retribution) . . . and/or causal beliefs (i.e., belief in deterrence).”). 
18. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 1. 
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criminal law and enforcement facilitated racial subordination.
19
  If, as these 
scholars contend, criminal law and enforcement function as sites of racial subor-
dination, then these systems operate against blacks. In other words, mass incar-
ceration and intense police surveillance are imposed upon—or done to—blacks. 
Indeed, U.S. crime policy reinforces racial oppression through many mecha-
nisms rooted in historical racism, including coerced labor,
20
 denial of political 
rights,
21
 economic deprivation,
22
 loss of educational opportunity,
23
 and the in-
ﬂiction of physical and emotional trauma.
24
 
The racial dimensions of U.S. criminal law and enforcement have inspired a 
new generation of activists to organize and contest abusive police conduct, mass 
incarceration, and other contemporary policies that disparately impact persons 
of color—particularly, blacks.
25
 Academic research linking mass incarceration 
and racial subordination has informed the work of many of these younger racial 
justice activists—including members of the Black Lives Matter Movement.
26
 
Thus, the antisubordination theory of criminal law and enforcement presently 
has substantial currency among academics and activists. 
 
19. See Roberts, supra note 9, at 1298-1300. 
20. Andrea C. Armstrong, Slavery Revisited in Penal Plantation Labor, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 870, 
891 n.135 (2012) (discussing inmate labor). 
21. JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMER-
ICAN DEMOCRACY (2006) (discussing felon disenfranchisement). 
22. Christy A. Visher, Sara A. Debus-Sherrill & Jennifer Yahner, Employment After Prison: A Lon-
gitudinal Study of Former Prisoners, 28 JUST. Q. 698-712 (2010) (discussing employment diffi-
culties faced by ex-offenders of color). 
23. David S. Kirk & Robert J. Samson, Juvenile Arrest and Collateral Educational Damage in the 
Transition to Adulthood, 86 SOC. EDUC. 36, 54 (2013) (“Our analysis shows that arrest in ado-
lescence hinders the transition to adulthood by undermining pathways to educational attain-
ment.”). 
24. Jason Schnittkera, Michael Massoglia & Christopher Uggena, Incarceration and the Health of 
the African American Community, 8 DU BOIS REV. 133, 137 (2011) (discussing health conse-
quences of incarceration for black Americans). 
25. Julius Bailey & David J. Leonard, Black Lives Matter: Post-Nihilistic Freedom Dreams, 5 J. CON-
TEMP. RHETORIC 67-69 (2015) (discussing the genesis of and focus on the Black Lives Matter 
movement). 
26. Eric Levitz, Two of the Intellectual Pillars of the Black Lives Matter Movement (Kind of) Endorsed 
Bernie Sanders, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 10, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/02/ta 
-nehisi-coates-just-sort-of-endorsed-sanders.html [http://perma.cc/GBJ9-DX8H] (observ-
ing that Alexander’s The New Jim Crow “is often called ‘the bible of the Black Lives Matter 
movement’”). 
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James Forman, Jr.’s Pulitzer Prize-winning book, Locking Up Our Own: Crime 
and Punishment in Black America,
27
 uncovers a “neglected story”
28
 that adds com-
plexity to contemporary understandings of race and crime, including those an-
tisubordination analyses that describe U.S. crime policy as an exercise of author-
ity by whites over blacks. Forman complicates prevailing academic arguments 
regarding race and crime by demonstrating that many blacks supported, en-
acted, and administered policies that expanded the policing and incarceration of 
other blacks. Forman integrates personal narratives—an academic style popular-
ized in critical race theory—with traditional analysis.
29
  Drawing extensively 
from his own personal experiences as a public defender in Washington, D.C., 
qualitative studies, and, to a lesser extent, opinion polls, election data, and em-
pirical research, Forman observes that increasing crime rates in the 1970s 
through 1990s caused many blacks to demand aggressive policing and longer 
punishments for criminals.
30
 
Forman has three primary objectives. First, he aims to uncover a modern 
history of black punitiveness, which correlated with high crime rates and in-
creased demand for tougher criminal law and enforcement policies among the 
general public.
31
  This historical account is often obscured in literature that 
frames mass incarceration and police surveillance as systems imposed upon ra-
ther than created—at least in part—by blacks. Forman’s research reveals that 
blacks exercised political power in ways that contributed to higher rates of incar-
ceration and greater police monitoring of blacks. Second, Forman seeks to ex-
plain that black punitiveness resulted from concerns about accelerating criminal-
ity and drug addiction among blacks.
32
 Fear of crime led black voters, legislators, 
 
27. FORMAN, supra note 1. 
28. I am borrowing from the terminology Peggy Cooper Davis uses to describe her research that 
unearths obscured perspectives of marginalized people in legal and political debates. See, e.g., 
Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and the Lawfulness of Roe v. Wade, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 299, 311 (1993) (discussing the importance of examining “perspectives of those who 
struggled” against oppression to create Reconstruction). 
29. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. 
L. REV. 2411 (1989). 
30. See infra Part I. 
31. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 10 (“[I] have tried to recover a portion of African American social, 
political, and intellectual history—a story that gets ignored or elided when we fail to appreci-
ate the role that blacks have played in shaping [punitive] criminal justice policy over the past 
forty years.”). 
32. Id. (“To understand [black punitive sentiment] we must start with a profound social fact: in 
the years preceding and during our punishment binge, black communities were devastated 
by historically unprecedented levels of crime and violence.”). 
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prosecutors, and judges to embrace harsher criminal law and enforcement poli-
cies. They asserted that community empowerment depended upon sobriety and 
freedom from the instability caused by violence and other forms of criminality. 
Many blacks contended that strong sentencing laws and police practices would 
facilitate these goals. Third, Forman seeks to demonstrate that even as blacks 
demanded tougher sentencing and police surveillance, many of them also sup-
ported social welfare policies, such as education and job training programs, that 
could combat the root causes of criminality.
33
 While blacks often favored a mix-
ture of punitive and preventive measures, political factors made punitive policies 
far more attractive and easier to implement.
34
 
Forman’s research makes a compelling contribution to scholarship regarding 
race and crime. His analysis of black punitive sentiment advances academic re-
search on the causes of mass incarceration and the inﬂuences of public attitudes 
towards crime and punishment. Forman’s research will undoubtedly reshape 
conversations on race and criminality and spark engagement from many scholars 
in the ﬁeld. Forman’s work could prove particularly helpful in public discourse 
regarding the future direction of U.S. criminal law and enforcement. As Ameri-
cans rethink the appropriateness of strict anticrime measures, it is important that 
scholars, politicians, and advocates have a comprehensive understanding of the 
origins of U.S. punitive sentiment. By offering a more complex analysis of puni-
tive social policy, Forman’s research will likely broaden the terms of public dis-
course regarding the reform of U.S. criminal law and enforcement. 
Though compelling in several respects, Forman’s research suffers from an 
important limitation: he does not thoroughly analyze the white supremacist di-
mensions of U.S. punitive sentiment, including punitiveness among blacks. 
While Forman does not devote much attention to white supremacy, he recog-
nizes the centrality of racism in American criminal law and enforcement.
35
 
Nonetheless, insufficient analysis of racism leaves Forman’s work vulnerable to 
the perception that he seeks to minimize the importance of white supremacy in 
the development of mass incarceration. Indeed, one legal scholar has already 
cited to Forman’s research in order to debunk antiracist criticism of U.S. criminal 
law and enforcement.
36
 Employing Forman’s research to undermine antiracist 
legal theory, however, would distort the goals of his compelling project. To elab-
orate this point, this Review examines three important implications of Forman’s 
 
33. Id. at 12 (stating that African Americans wanted punitive policies and economic development). 
34. Id. (stating that “American racism” made antipoverty programs politically infeasible). 
35. Id. (stating that “it is impossible to understand American crime policy without appreciating 
racism’s enduring role.”). 
36. See infra text accompanying notes 144-154. 
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research that should alleviate any tension a reader might ﬁnd between his obser-
vations and antiracist critiques of U.S. criminal law and enforcement. First, black 
support for aggressive criminal policies could stem in part from racial stereo-
types and negative in-group preferences among blacks that derive from perva-
sive antiblack stereotypes.
37
 Second, although Forman’s title suggests that Lock-
ing Up Our Own explores “crime and punishment in black America,” his research 
is geographically limited: it focuses almost exclusively on historical moments 
among black Washingtonians. Washington, D.C., however, represents a fairly 
unique site of black political power.
38
 As such, even if black Washingtonians had 
the political power to enact pro-carceral policies, black residents in most other 
places did not. Third, while Forman carefully analyzes punitiveness among 
blacks in Washington, D.C., he misses an opportunity to situate his analysis 
within a comparative framework. Although blacks became more punitive as vi-
olent crime increased during the latter part of the twentieth century, punitive 
attitudes among blacks always remained much lower than corresponding per-
spectives among whites.
39
 Furthermore, while scholars have linked blacks’ puni-
tiveness to their exposure to criminality, numerous studies indicate that white 
punitiveness typically stems from racial resentment.
40
 Also, many studies ﬁnd 
that blacks are less punitive than whites because they do not trust law enforce-
ment and believe that the U.S. legal system discriminates against blacks.
41
 These 
additional considerations provide a complementary framework for contextualiz-
ing Forman’s important research.
42
 After attending to these primary concerns, 
this Review analyzes the possibility of implementing the type of reforms that 
 
37. See infra Section II.A. 
38. See infra Section II.B.1. 
39. See Mark D. Ramirez, Punitive Sentiment, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 329, 352 (2013). Ramirez measures 
punitiveness across four different categories, including support for the death penalty, harsher 
sentencing by courts, expanding the authority of law enforcement, and increased expendi-
tures to toughen law enforcement. See id. at 337-38. 
40. Eva G. T. Green, Christian Staerklé & David O. Sears, Symbolic Racism and Whites’ Attitudes 
Towards Punitive and Preventive Crime Policies, 30 LAW & HUM. BEH. 435, 444-45 (2006); see 
also Lawrence D. Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste for Punishment: Black and White Americans’ 
Views on the Death Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DU BOIS REV. 151, 171-72 (2004) (“[T]he 
most consistent predictor of criminal justice policy attitudes is, in fact, a form of racial preju-
dice. While racial resentment does not ever explain a large share of the variation in any of the 
attitudes we have measured, it is the most consistently inﬂuential of the variables outside of 
race classiﬁcation itself.”). 
41. Indeed, research links the black-white racial-punitiveness gap to the combined racial resent-
ment of whites and perceived systemic racism by blacks. See Devon Johnson, Racial Prejudice, 
Perceived Injustice, and the Black-White Gap in Punitive Attitudes, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 198, 204 
(2008) (“The results indicate that the racial gap in support for harsh criminal justice policies 
is linked to racial prejudice on the part of Whites and perceived injustice among Blacks.”). 
42. See infra Section II.B.2. 
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Forman advocates, namely the development of more merciful approaches to 
criminality. While Forman makes a persuasive case for departing from the cur-
rent state of affairs, substantial political and social constraints—including rac-
ism, punitive sentiment, and conservative political ideology—will impede the 
implementation of the reforms he advocates. 
This Review proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the principal arguments 
and conclusions Forman makes in Locking Up Our Own. It also examines the 
positive contributions Forman’s research brings to legal scholarship regarding 
race and crime. Part II, the heart of the Review, considers the implications of 
Forman’s research and attempts to reconcile his conclusions with antiracist liter-
ature. Part III examines the possibility of enacting the criminal law reforms that 
Forman advocates. While Forman urges policymakers and reformers to discard 
the harsh punitive approaches that gave rise to mass incarceration and to em-
brace mercy and forgiveness, the current political climate might make such a 
shift in legal culture difficult. That being said, state democratic and judicial pro-
cesses and federal litigation could lead to some reforms. Proponents of criminal 
law and enforcement reform must utilize multidimensional mobilization strate-
gies—involving courts, legislatures, executives, social movement organizations, 
and media—in order to accomplish the types of policy changes that Forman pro-
poses.
43
 
i .  locking up our own: arguments and contributions 
In Locking Up Our Own, Forman complicates racial explanations for mass 
incarceration by revealing that blacks supported many of the criminal law and 
enforcement policies that contributed to the rapid rise of incarceration in the 
United States between the 1970s and the 2000s. This Section summarizes For-
man’s principal arguments and conclusions. 
A. Neglected Story: Black Punitiveness 
Social science research indicates that blacks are far less punitive than 
whites,
44
 especially with respect to harsh penalties such as capital punishment.
45
 
 
43. See infra  III. 
44. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 199 (“When it comes to punishing criminals, Blacks have his-
torically been less punitive than Whites.”). 
45. Bobo & Johnson, supra note 40 (ﬁnding a racial gap in black and white support for the death 
penalty); John K. Cochran & Mitchell B. Chamlin, The Enduring Racial Divide in Death Penalty 
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This academic literature has led to a popular understanding of blacks as distrust-
ful of law enforcement—a view documented by numerous empirical studies.
46
 
Forman’s research, however, complicates this traditional perspective by unearth-
ing a neglected part of U.S. history during which black support for punitive 
measures gave rise to the enactment of policies that led to increased police sur-
veillance and incarceration. Focusing almost exclusively on Washington, D.C., 
Forman examines the attitudes of black politicians, civilians, police officers, 
judges, and prosecutors. Forman chooses to study Washington, D.C. because by 
the mid-1970s, blacks constituted a supermajority of the city’s population.
47
 Fur-
thermore, in 1973, Congress enacted the Home Rule Act, which gave Washing-
ton, D.C. residents the power to elect their own mayor and city council.
48
 When 
home rule was established, Washington, D.C. had only one majority-white po-
litical district.
49
 Thus, black voters wielded substantial power in determining 
who would serve as a member of the city council and as mayor. In 1975, Wash-
ington, D.C.’s ﬁrst black mayor in one hundred years took office (sworn in, as 
Forman observes, by Thurgood Marshall, the ﬁrst black Supreme Court Jus-
tice).
50
 Many Washington, D.C. blacks used their growing political power to en-
act and enforce punitive measures that disparately impacted other blacks. 
 
Support, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 85, 85 (2006) (“Among the various ‘known’ correlates of death pen-
alty support, one of the strongest and most persistent predictors is respondent’s race. Whites 
are signiﬁcantly more supportive of capital punishment than are Blacks.”). 
46. Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance Policing: A Study 
of Inner-City Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255, 261 (2010) 
(“[R]esearch concerning citizens’ attitudes toward police has consistently found that black 
adults and adolescents report more dissatisfaction and distrust than their counterparts from 
other racial groups.”); Yolander G. Hurst, James Frank & Sandra Lee Browning, The Attitudes 
of Juveniles Toward the Police: A Comparison of Black and White Youth, 23 POLICING: AN INT’L J. 
OF POLICE STRATEGIES & MAN. 37, 38 (2000) (observing that “many studies have found that 
race is a signiﬁcant determinant of attitudes, with blacks holding less favorable attitudes to-
ward the police than whites”); Tom R. Tyler, Policing in Black and White: Ethnic Group Differ-
ences in Trust and Conﬁdence in the Police, 8 POLICE Q. 322, 323 (2005) (observing that “it has 
been repeatedly shown that there is a wide gap between the levels of trust and conﬁdence 
found among minorities and Whites—with minorities especially distrustful of the police”). 
47. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 18. 
48. Id. at 19. 
49. Id. at 19-20. 
50. Id. at 19. 
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1. Antidrug Punitiveness 
As many commentators have demonstrated, the “War on Drugs” has severely 
impacted “low-income African American communities.”
51
 Nevertheless, as For-
man carefully explains, in 1975, Washington, D.C. blacks used their political 
power to defeat a measure that would have decriminalized possession of small 
amounts of marijuana.
52
 Marijuana arrests in Washington, D.C. had increased 
900% between 1968 and 1975, and blacks were disproportionately impacted.
53
 
Seeking to address this issue, David Clarke—a liberal white Washington, D.C. 
city council member—sponsored a bill that would have eliminated prison sen-
tences for minor marijuana possession.
54
 Clarke tried to secure support for the 
bill among his colleagues by providing evidence which indicated that Washing-
ton, D.C. police and prosecutors discriminatorily enforced antimarijuana laws to 
the detriment of blacks.
55
 Furthermore, he argued that marijuana arrests led to 
debilitating collateral consequences, as the stigma of a marijuana arrest, even 
without a conviction, impeded blacks’ access to employment, housing, and edu-
cational opportunities.
56
 Although Washington, D.C. had a majority black city 
council and local population as well as a black mayor, Clarke failed to persuade 
the city to enact drug-law reform. 
As Forman’s exhaustive research reveals, many Washington, D.C. blacks re-
jected Clarke’s proposal due to high rates of drug addiction among blacks in the 
city.
57
 By the 1960s, heroin use had become a substantial problem in Washing-
ton, D.C.
58
 Heroin addiction was linked to criminal activity and incarceration—
demonstrated by the addiction rate among men detained in Washington, D.C. 
jails approaching ﬁfty percent in 1969.
59
 While black activists often expressed 
 
51. Id. at 17. This observation is consistent with ﬁndings in academic literature. See, e.g., Kenneth 
B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on Drugs” Was a 
“War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 381, 381 (2002) (“The War on Drugs has had a 
devastating effect on African American communities nationwide.”). 
52. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 17-46 (discussing the 1975 marijuana decriminalization effort in 
Washington, D.C.). 
53. Id. at 20. Speciﬁcally, Forman observes that eighty percent of Washington, D.C.’s marijuana 
arrestees were black. 
54. Id. at 22. 
55. Id. at 22-23. 
56. Id. at 23-24. 
57. Id. at 25 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
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some concern for heroin addicts,
60
 they also opposed successful public health 
policies like methadone maintenance, which they viewed as encouraging drug 
dependency.
61
 
Forman provides a rich analysis of blacks’ use of racial justice rhetoric to le-
gitimize tough antidrug policies. He vividly recounts how Douglas Moore—a 
black Washington, D.C. city council member—became an outspoken and skillful 
opponent of Clarke’s proposal.
62
 Moore, a former black nationalist,
63
 argued 
that lenient drug laws would reinforce a systemic lack of concern for black lives 
among law enforcement.
64
 Like Moore, many blacks believed that police dis-
criminatorily withheld protection from them.
65
 Moore contended that Clarke’s 
proposal would perpetuate this structural indifference by allowing the police to 
wash their hands of black drug addicts.
66
 Moore also argued that the marijuana 
liberalization movement actually sought to protect white youth from incarcera-
tion for drug offenses; he contended that advocates of leniency cynically em-
ployed black suffering in order to make drug use less punitive for whites.
67
 In 
addition, Moore and other activists asserted that drug-liberalization policies 
would lead to increased drug use among blacks and that this would detract from 
antiracist politics and individual betterment.
68
 
Forman observes that themes of racial justice animated public hearings re-
garding Clarke’s proposal.
69
 Black clergy, a politically inﬂuential lobby, framed 
their disagreement with the measure as a moral issue. They argued that mariju-
ana use caused psychological harms and criminality and that marijuana was a 
gateway to more harmful drugs.
70
 Limited polling data indicated that blacks op-
posed decriminalization of marijuana by a slim margin, while a solid majority of 
 
60. Id. at 27 (discussing black activists’ acceptance of modest methadone treatment for heroin 
addicts). 
61. Id. at 27. 
62. Id. at 33. 
63. See Juan Williams, The Many Facets of Douglas Moore, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 1978), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1978/09/05/the-many-facets-of-douglas-moore
/78f31f70-0573-4a84-8bd0-18a37371fbae [http://perma.cc/A4VR-MQHT]. 
64. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 35. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 36-37. Some blacks took an even more extreme position. Stokely Carmichael, for exam-
ple, described drugs as a weapon of racism. He contended that whites sent “drugs into the 
[black] community” in order to nullify black opposition to racial oppression. Id. at 37. 
69. Id. at 37-38. 
70. Id. at 39-40. 
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whites supported it.
71
 Nevertheless, the city council approved Clarke’s proposal 
by an 8-4 vote.
72
 Federal law, however, required a second city council vote and 
mayoral approval.
73
 Local activists, particularly the powerful black ministers’ 
lobby, intensiﬁed their opposition.
74
 Eventually, Sterling Tucker, a black man 
who chaired the city council, tabled the bill, effectively killing it.
75
 Forman sug-
gests that Tucker feared political reprisals from black ministers and, possibly, 
voters.
76
 
Forman offers additional examples of punitiveness among Washington, D.C. 
blacks, many of which involve the use of racial equality themes to justify imple-
mentation of harsh anticrime policy. For instance, in a 1976 article, Carl Rowan, 
a prominent black journalist, contended that “locking up thugs is not vindic-
tive,”
77
 but rather a way to prevent violent offenders from “terroriz[ing] minor-
ity communities again and again.”
78
 Longer sentences advanced the betterment 
of blacks and promoted racial equality. Similarly, former police chief Burtell Jef-
ferson, a black man, also supported tougher legislation, and he found an ally on 
the city council in John Ray, a prominent Washington, D.C. black attorney.
79
 
Ray sponsored a bill that would have raised maximum sentences for a number 
 
71. As Forman concedes, this poll did not ask respondents to consider the precise issue presented 
by Clarke’s proposal. Id. at 42. It is also the only poll he cites regarding Washington, D.C. 
black opinion on marijuana laws. Furthermore, the study is susceptible to other interpreta-
tions that do not indicate signiﬁcant disparities between black and white opinion, particularly 
that the intersection of age and race, rather than race alone, inﬂuenced respondents’ views on 
marijuana. See Jay Matthews, Legal Marijuana Opposed: Survey Shows 55 Percent in Area Would 
Oppose, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1975, at B5 (“A heavy concentration of relatively young, white 
college grads in the District apparently has produced survey results in the city far different 
from those in the rest of the Washington area.”); id. (“The only clear support for legalization 
came from residents under 30 years old . . . .”); id. (reporting minimal racial variation among 
residents in the D.C. metropolitan area). The actual study is not contained in the archives of 
the now-defunct Bureau of Social Science Statistics housed at the University of Maryland. 
Conversation with Eric C. Stoykovich, Historical Manuscripts Project Archivist, Special Col-
lections, University of Maryland (Oct. 27, 2017). 
72. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 41. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 42. 
75. Id. at 43. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 128. 
78. Id. at 129. 
79. Id. at 130-31. 
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of offenses, including terms of ﬁfteen and ten years, respectively, for selling her-
oin and cocaine and three years for marijuana.
80
 Ray also backed mandatory 
minimum sentences for various gun-related offenses.
81
 Ray promoted his pro-
posal in racial equality terms, noting that crimes involving black victims typically 
received lower sentences than similar crimes with white victims.
82
 Mandating 
minimum sentences and increasing maximum sentences for crimes would secure 
equal justice for black victims. 
Forman presents a complicated historical account of the political battle over 
sentencing law by revealing that many black activists and governmental officials 
opposed Ray’s proposal. For example, the Washington, D.C. chapter of the 
NAACP advocated a more cautious approach that would have allowed judges to 
retain discretion over sentencing.
83
 Also, the Urban League contended that Ray’s 
proposal would not reduce crime.
84
 Despite these objections from established 
civil rights organizations, the Washington, D.C. city council increased maximum 
sentences for drug crimes; the minimum-sentences proposal failed.
85
 
2. Punitiveness Regarding Gun-Related Violence 
Forman also analyzes black support for the enactment of tough penalties for 
gun-related crimes.
86
 Although contemporary observers might not view gun-
control policies as punitive, the proposals that Forman analyzes sought to crim-
inalize all gun possession in Washington, D.C. and to impose prison terms for 
violations, including mandatory sentences for repeat offenders.
87
 As Forman ob-
serves, black lawmakers in Washington, D.C. supported tough gun-control 
measures in response to growing public fear resulting from a sharply increasing 
homicide rate.
88
 Forman speciﬁcally examines the successful efforts of John Wil-
son, a black city council member, to enact punitive measures in response to gun-
 
80. Id. at 131. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 132. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 133. Ray would later sponsor a successful ballot initiative that implemented mandatory 
minimum sentences for drug and gun offenses. See id. at 139, 143. 
86. Id. at 56-77. 
87. Id. at 56. 
88. Id. at 57-60. 
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related violence.
89
 Wilson hailed from a civil rights background, having partici-
pated in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee when he was 
younger.
90
 Despite the historical use of U.S. crime policy to subordinate blacks, 
Wilson’s solution for violent crime was decidedly punitive.
91
 He introduced a 
measure that would have prohibited the “sale, purchase, and possession of all 
handguns and shotguns” in Washington, D.C.
92
 Wilson also advocated manda-
tory minimum sentences for gun-related offenses.
93
 
As Forman’s thorough research demonstrates, public hearings regarding 
Wilson’s proposal follow a similar pattern forged by earlier political advocacy: 
these hearings used civil rights rhetoric to justify punitive policies. Supporters 
of Wilson’s plan argued that violence hindered black unity and dampened 
pride.
94
 Black ministers dramatically recounted officiating funerals of homicide 
victims.
95
 They also reminded council members that guns ended the lives of 
many civil rights icons, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
96
 Although some 
supporters of Wilson’s plan conceded that gun control laws would not address 
the social and economic factors that led to criminality,
97
 they nonetheless em-
phasized that blacks deserved protection from violence, along with policies that 
addressed economic inequality.
98
 In other words, some black proponents of gun 
control favored a multifaceted approach that included stricter criminal laws and 
the expansion of economic opportunity for blacks.
99
 
Forman deepens his historical analysis by observing that blacks who opposed 
gun control also employed racial justice narratives. Douglas Moore, who fought 
Clarke’s marijuana decriminalization proposal, became an important opponent 
of gun control. Moore argued that blacks needed guns to defend themselves 
from white racial terrorism and violence by other blacks.
100
 Forman correctly 
 
89. Id. at 55-61, 71. 
90. Id. at 55. 
91. Id. at 56. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 60. 
94. Id. at 57-58. 
95. Id. at 59. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 64. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 63-64. Ultimately, the city council did not approve Wilson’s proposal for a complete ban 
on guns. Instead, the city required gun registration and prohibited owners from acquiring 
additional guns. The legislation only created a ten-day sentence for offenders. Id. at 71. 
100. Id. at 64-65. 
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links these arguments to a historical tradition of blacks viewing gun ownership 
as necessary for combating white racial violence.
101
 
3. Aggressive Policing and Black Police Officers 
Forman also examines how black police contributed to the criminalization of 
other blacks. While antiracist advocacy has historically focused on the role of all- 
or predominately white police forces in the perpetuation of racial subordina-
tion,
102
 Forman complicates this narrative with his study of police practices in 
Washington, D.C., which had a majority-black police force by the late-1970s.
103
 
 Many blacks once viewed integration of police forces as a critical component 
of racial justice.
104
 As Forman’s research demonstrates, however, black officers 
typically did not consider themselves to be agents of civil rights. Instead, their 
advocacy focused on good jobs, wages, beneﬁts, and working conditions.
105
 Fur-
thermore, Forman ﬁnds that many black police officers held negative views of 
 
101. Id. at 65-70. 
102. See Vicky M. Wilkins & Brian N. Williams, Black or Blue: Racial Proﬁling and Representative 
Bureaucracy, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 654, 654 (2008) (“Historically, American policing has a 
heritage of legally sanctioned, disparate service delivery and the enforcement of racially mo-
tivated laws and statutes, inclusive of slave codes, black codes, and other oppressive policies 
directed toward Africans, African Americans, and other marginalized populations.”). 
103. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 78-115. 
104. As Forman observes, many different assumptions sustained this optimistic perspective. Blacks 
thought that black police officers would command greater respect from and compliance by 
black civilians, encourage cooperation by informants, and demonstrate a stronger commit-
ment to protection of black life. They also assumed that black officers would respect the rule 
of law more evenhandedly than white officers. According to the civil rights argument, black 
officers would be less prone to harassing blacks or utilizing excessive force, and they would be 
able to distinguish law-abiding blacks from criminals. Some activists advocated black police 
as a means of economic advancement, while others believed that arming blacks and giving 
them State authority would deconstruct white supremacist notions of black inferiority. Blacks 
also resented white police wielding authority—often abusively—in black neighborhoods. Po-
lice had their history in slave patrols—a fact that was not lost among civil rights activists. 
Many blacks viewed black police as an appropriate solution for police misconduct and abuses. 
Id. at 79-80. 
105. Id. at 110. Black police contested race-matching—being assigned to work in black communi-
ties exclusively. They viewed this practice as an extension of Jim Crow. They also challenged 
exclusionary practices that kept them from advancing to supervisory positions, and they de-
manded affirmative action policies that would enhance their presence on police forces. Id. at 
90-91, 99. 
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blacks and supported stronger punitive measures, including mandatory mini-
mum sentences for drug and gun offenses.
106
 Some of these officers felt embar-
rassed by criminality among blacks and believed that aggressive policing would 
alleviate the problem.
107
 Further undermining the racial justice argument for in-
tegrated police forces, black officers often harassed other blacks and subjected 
them to excessive force.
108
 
In one of the most compelling sections of Locking Up Our Own, Forman an-
alyzes the relationship between harsh policing tactics and the advent of crack 
cocaine in the late-1980s.
109
 As Forman observes, fear of crack cocaine-related 
crime led to black acceptance of “warrior policing”
110
—or quasi-military police 
patrols in poor black urban neighborhoods.
111
 Despite the invasive and racially 
disparate nature of these practices, the burgeoning crime associated with crack 
cocaine addiction and trafficking legitimized aggressive policing.
112
 For example, 
the president of a Maryland NAACP chapter described crack cocaine as “the 
worst thing to hit us since slavery.”
113
 From this perspective, aggressive policing 
and harsh punishment of drug dealers were part of an abolitionary project.
114
 
Forman’s research reveals that, in the climate of fear caused by crack cocaine-
related violence, urban police forces obtained powerful weapons and engaged in 
aggressive practices. At a 1988 press conference in Washington, D.C., Mayor 
 
106. Id. at 108, 114. 
107. Id. at 109. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 151. 
110. Id. at 155-56. 
111. Id. at 156. 
112. Id. at 156-57. 
113. Id. at 158 (also discussing an article in the Los Angeles Sentinel, a black newspaper, asserting 
that the crack cocaine epidemic “is perhaps the most serious threat we have faced since the 
end of slavery”). 
114. Although Forman ultimately takes a skeptical stance towards policing, other scholars have 
argued that courts should accommodate black community demands for more stringent polic-
ing due to their vulnerability to criminality. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The 
Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v Morales, 1998 U. CHI. L. F. 
197, 198 (“Though the residents of inner city communities increasingly demand law enforce-
ment measures in response to the crime problems they face, the understanding of constitu-
tional criminal procedural rights promoted by Youkhana and Morales threatens to hamper and 
retard the development of innovative community policing measures these citizens desire.”); 
see also Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 699 (1998) (arguing 
that “inner city” residents should have the authority to impose aggressive police tactics on 
their communities in order to combat crime and that criminal procedure doctrines should 
accommodate these decisions). 
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Marion Barry demonstrated a new automatic weapon and boasted about the 
power it would give local police.
115
 In 1986, Isaac Fulwood, a black man, became 
the assistant chief of ﬁeld operations for the Washington, D.C. police depart-
ment.
116
  In this position, Fulwood developed “Operation Clean Sweep,” the 
city’s most aggressive law enforcement response to crack cocaine and other illegal 
drugs.
117
 Operation Clean Sweep utilized a number of aggressive techniques, in-
cluding “surveillance of street sales with arrests made by jump-out squads,” 
“buy-busts,” “reverse stings,” “undercover buys,” “uniformed saturation patrol,” 
“roadblocks,” “seizure and forfeiture of drugs, weapons, cash, cars,” and “raids 
on crack houses.”
118
 Mayor Barry promised that Operation Clean Sweep would 
“make it hotter on drug dealers and pushers who are destroying the minds of 
our young people.”
119
 Though short-lived, Operation Clean Sweep led to a sub-
stantial increase in drug arrests.
120
 Nonetheless, while Fulwood designed the ag-
gressive antidrug program, he later expressed internal conﬂict regarding its 
toughness. Fulwood stated during an interview that Operation Clean Sweep 
only proved that Washington, D.C. was “very proﬁcient at arresting drug dealers 
and users . . . .”
121
 He conceded that the program did not end drug addiction in 
the city; accomplishing this goal required allocation of more resources for “edu-
cation and treatment.”
122
 
 
115. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 167. 
116. Peter Hermann, Isaac Fulwood, Washington Police Chief During Tumultuous Era, Dies at  
77, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/Isaac 
-fulwood-washington-police-chief-during-tumultuous-era-dies-at-77/2017/09/01
/7a3a8900-8f80-11e7-84c0-02cc069f2c37_story.html [http://perma.cc/AB4P-UDUJ]. 
117. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 167. 
118. Edward F. Connors, III & Hugh Nugent, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Street-Level Narcotics 
Enforcement, U.S. DEPT. JUST. 33-34 (1990), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization
/123726NCJRS.pdf [http://perma.cc/3E83-QTHS]. 
119. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 168. 
120. Id. (noting “unprecedented” drug arrests in “only a couple of years”); Connors & Nugent, 
supra note 118, at 34 (“In its ﬁrst year, Clean Sweep produced 23,000 arrests, 12,700 of them 
drug-related; 2,700 convictions with sentences; 4,800 convictions with ﬁnes; seizures of $10 
million worth of drugs, $950,000 in cash, 351 vehicles, and 632 weapons.”).The city shut 
down the program because it was funded with police overtime budgets, making it too costly. 
In addition, local penal institutions and courts could not manage the increased prison popu-
lation and caseload. Id. at 35. 
121. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 168. 
122. Id. at 168-69. 
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4. Black Judges and Prosecutors 
Drawing extensively from his experiences as a criminal defense attorney, For-
man also analyzes punitiveness among black judges and prosecutors in Wash-
ington, D.C. In the ﬁrst pages of his book, Forman describes a sentencing hear-
ing during which a judge rejected his proposal that a juvenile client receive 
probation rather than incarceration.
123
 The judge clothed his decision in civil 
rights rhetoric. Delivering “the Martin Luther King speech,”
124
 the judge asserted 
that by engaging in criminal activity, the black youth had squandered opportu-
nities the Civil Rights Movement created for him: 
Now you can go to school, study hard, live your dreams. It isn’t easy—I 
know that. But it is possible. And people fought, struggled, and died for 
that possibility. Dr. King died for that, son. And what are you doing? Not 
studying! No, you are cutting class, runnin’ and thuggin’, not listening to 
your momma or grandmother. Instead, you want to listen to some hood-
lum friends.
125
 
Black prosecutors also invoked civil rights rhetoric to justify their punitive-
ness. For example, Eric Holder, who served as U.S. Attorney for the District of 
Columbia, criticized black criminality during a Dr. Martin Luther King Day cel-
ebration in 1995.
126
 Holder said, “Dr. King would be shocked and disheartened 
by the condition of his people in 1995—and I, for one, would be ashamed to 
reveal to him what we have let happen to our community.”
127
 Holder also stated 
that black criminality, the product of “misguided or malicious members of our 
own race,” undermined King’s accomplishments.
128
 
B. Toward Forgiveness and Mercy 
In the ﬁnal section of Locking Up Our Own, Forman advocates reform. Like 
scholars such as Bryan Stevenson,
129
 Forman argues that judges and prosecutors 
 
123. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 3-8. 
124. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
125. Id. at 4. 
126. Id. at 195. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. See generally BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2014) 
(describing Stevenson’s personal experiences with the justice system as a criminal defense at-
torney and advocating reform). 
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must undergo a cultural shift toward mercy and away from punitiveness.
130
 He 
persuasively makes the case for a more compassionate, rather than retributory, 
legal system by telling the story of a young black male client who avoided a 
prison sentence after pleading guilty to robbery.
131
 Many readers will ﬁnd For-
man’s narratives in this section among the most compelling in the book. Alt-
hough the judge and prosecutor wanted Forman’s client to spend time in 
prison,
132
 Forman boldly asked the victim to testify at the sentencing hearing in 
opposition to incarceration.
133
 After Forman informed the victim of his client’s 
childhood disadvantages and his potential for future success, the victim agreed 
to speak on the defendant’s behalf.
134
 Forman’s strategy proved successful, as the 
judge ordered probation.
135
 
Forman also criticizes popular reform efforts advocated by many liberals and 
progressives.
136
 Speciﬁcally, he argues that proposals that centralize reduction of 
penalties for “nonviolent drug offenders” will not eradicate mass incarceration, 
because nonviolent drug offenders represent only a small portion of the U.S. in-
carcerated population.
137
 The individuals who make up the largest segment of 
the prison population and those with the longest sentences have committed vi-
olent crimes.
138
 Accordingly, reserving leniency for nonviolent drug offenders 
will not lead to a substantial decrease in the overall U.S. prison population. Re-
cently, other scholars have criticized reforms limited to nonviolent drug offend-
ers on the same grounds as Forman.
139
 
Forman’s research makes a valuable contribution to debates regarding the 
intersection of race and crime, adding much needed context to literature con-
cerning punitiveness among blacks. Despite the overall success of Forman’s en-
deavor, Locking Up Our Own has some important limitations. The next Part iden-
tiﬁes some of those limits and uses them as a vehicle for analyzing the critical 
 
130. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 237 (“Our challenge as Americans is to recognize the power each of 
us has in our own spheres to push back against the harshness of mass incarceration.”). 
131. Id. at 222-36. 
132. Id. at 223-24. 
133. Id. at 232-35. 
134. Id. at 232-35. 
135. Id. at 235-36. 
136. See id. at 185-202 (discussing the link between violent crime and mass incarceration). 
137. Id. at 220. 
138. Id. at 230 (“People who have committed a violent offense make up 53% of the nation’s state 
prisoners . . . .”). 
139. See, e.g., PFAFF, supra note 3, at 35-36 (questioning criminal law reform efforts that centralize 
nonviolent drug offenders). 
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implications of Forman’s research for antiracist accounts of U.S. criminal law and 
enforcement. 
i i .  racial nuances in black support for aggressive 
policing and strong punitive measures 
Although Forman provides a nuanced analysis of black perspectives on police 
and punishment, his research does not substantially analyze white supremacy. 
Forman’s focus on black punitiveness, however, does not make racism irrelevant 
to his project. Indeed, Forman emphatically states that he does not wish to ob-
scure the role of racism in the development of mass incarceration.
140
 To this end, 
Forman contends that societal racism framed the punitiveness of blacks and their 
elected officials.
141
 Forman also attributes racially discriminatory practices such 
as felon disenfranchisement, prosecutorial exclusion of blacks from juries, and 
public support for tough punitive measures to pervasive implicit racial biases.
142
 
Furthermore, Forman qualiﬁes his analysis of black punitiveness by observing 
that blacks often sought tougher criminal law and enforcement policies together 
with a broader package of economic reforms that could have potentially tackled 
the root causes of criminality. Racism, however, made broad economic reforms 
politically infeasible.
143
 
Notwithstanding these important observations, Forman’s inattention to rac-
ism might lead skeptical scholars or other commentators to use his research to 
question antisubordination theories of U.S. criminal law and enforcement.
144
 In-
deed, at least one academic has already relied upon Forman’s work to criticize 
 
140. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 11 (“But in focusing on the actions of black officials, I do not mini-
mize the role of whites or of racism in the development of mass incarceration.”). 
141. Id. at 11-12 (arguing that “racism shaped the political, economic, and legal context in which 
the black community and its elected representatives made their choices”). 
142. Id. at 12. 
143. Id. 
144. At least two reviews of Locking Up Our Own have reached a similar conclusion. See Devon W. 
Carbado & L. Song Richardson, The Black Police: Policing Our Own, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1979, 
1980 (2018) (“Some might deploy Forman’s book to advance the proposition that race has 
played less of a role in the mass incarceration of African Americans than liberals and progres-
sives like to admit. After all, black people have been agents, and not just victims, of mass 
incarceration.”); Jemar Tisby, Mass Incarceration and the “Politics of Respectability,” CARDUS 
(Dec. 14, 2017), http://www.cardus.ca/comment/article/5165/mass-incarceration-and-the 
-politics-of-respectability/ [http://perma.cc/3786-KZT9] (“Some readers may be tempted to 
read Locking Up Our Own as a book about how black people supported harsh penalties for 
other black people, thus shifting culpability away from America’s long history of racism and 
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antiracist accounts of U.S. crime policy. In a recent publication, Dan Subotnik 
attempts to rebut arguments William Nelson makes regarding the distributional 
effects of state criminal law and enforcement.
145
 Recounting his own personal 
experiences contesting a traffic citation, Nelson argues that U.S. criminal law and 
enforcement, particularly courts, operate in an authoritarian fashion
146
 and that 
the burdens of this system likely fall more harshly on persons of color and poor 
whites
147
 rather than white male lawyers (such as Nelson).
148
 Although Nelson 
makes several arguments in support of his observations regarding U.S. legal pro-
cess, Subotinik reserves his deepest criticism for Nelson’s racial inequality 
claims.
149
 Subotnik contends that Nelson, like antiracist theorists, focuses “in-
discriminately” on race and class.
150
 Subotnik also argues that antiracist critics 
 
excusing the racism embedded in the criminal justice system. After all, if black people sup-
ported the same consequences and approaches to law enforcement as some white people, then 
mass incarceration really has nothing to do with race. As the book title indicates, black people 
locked up their own.”). White ambivalence regarding the ongoing signiﬁcance of racism is 
particularly meaningful in this setting. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Undigniﬁed: The 
Supreme Court, Racial Justice, and Dignity Claims, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1, 43 & n.260 (2017) (citing 
On Views of Race and Inequality, Blacks and Whites Are Worlds Apart, PEW RES. CTR. (June  
27, 2016), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/06/27/on-views-of-race-and-inequality 
-blacks-and-whites-are-worlds-apart [http://perma.cc/B93W-NEDQ] (reporting that ﬁfty-
three percent of whites and eighty-eight percent of blacks believe “more changes [are] 
needed”; twenty-two percent of whites and sixty-four percent of blacks believe employers 
treat blacks less fairly; and thirty-six percent of whites and seventy percent of blacks believe 
racial discrimination prevents blacks from “getting ahead”). 
145. See Dan Subotnik, The Simple Meaning of Stop Signs: A Response to Professor William Nelson, 33 
TOURO L. REV. 739 (2017) (criticizing William E. Nelson, The Emerging American Police State: 
The Problem Is Not with the Police, but Higher Up, 33 TOURO L. REV. 709 (2017), and dismissing 
the claim of racial proﬁling made by a law professor). 
146. William E. Nelson, The Emerging American Police State: The Problem Is Not with the Police, but 
Higher Up, 33 TOURO L. REV. 710 (2017)(“I believe my experience and observations in this 
proceeding potentially offer insights into why the law enforcement system, though not nec-
essarily police officers themselves, increasingly appears to function like an authoritarian police 
state and why many Americans, especially Americans of color and other minority groups, in-
creasingly ﬁnd the legal system unfair, unjust, and oppressive.”). 
147. Id. at 721. 
148. Id. at 728 (“I wondered what an African-American, Latino, recent Asian immigrant, or poor 
white person, who unlike me does not have a law degree, would conclude when confronting 
the same police state . . . . [C]ould a poor African-American, Latino, recent Asian immigrant, 
or poor white who lacked the resources, knowledge, and personal contacts that I possess have 
made the same decision [to hire counsel and contest the ticket]?”). 
149. Subotnik, supra note 145, at 743 (“There is something even more problematical [sic] about the 
race/class charge.”). 
150. Id. 
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of U.S. criminal law and enforcement invoke race due to the potency of the sub-
ject rather than the actual relevance of racism.
151
 Furthermore, Subotnik asserts 
that “too much speech on [race] is fatuous and manipulative;”
152
 the context of 
this contention makes it clear that Subotnik actually means antiracist speech. Su-
botnik also cites the work of several black scholars, including Forman, to justify 
his skepticism regarding antiracist criticism of U.S. criminal law and enforce-
ment.
153
 Speciﬁcally, Subotnik argues that Forman’s analysis of black punitive-
ness substantially undermines commentary that links mass incarceration with 
racism.
154
 Subotnik has published numerous articles that question or dismiss the 
ongoing relevance of race and sex discrimination,
155
 including within criminal 
law and enforcement.
156
 This Review contends that using Forman’s work to un-
dermine antiracist critiques of U.S. criminal law and enforcement in this way 
would be terribly misguided. Forman’s research implicates but does not give at-
tention to three important issues that help to alleviate any conﬂict a reader might 
ﬁnd between his observations and antiracist analysis of U.S. criminal law and 
 
151. Id. (“Because race and class are so rhetorically potent in our society, writers will reach for them 
when possible.”). 
152. Id. at 744. 
153. Id. (discussing Stanley Crouch, Richard Ford, and James Forman). 
154. Id. (rejecting antiracist criticism of U.S. criminal law and enforcement because “as black Yale 
law professor James Forman, Jr. recently pointed out, violent crime was behind more incar-
ceration and the black community was deeply complicit in the passage of crime control legis-
lation because it bore the burden of most crime” (citing FORMAN, supra note 1)). 
155. See, e.g., Dan Subotnik, Are Law Schools Racist? Part II, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 761, 769 (2009) (“All 
of us have a moral obligation to isolate and destroy racism when it rears its ugly face. For too 
long, however, we have undermined this goal by indulging in promiscuous charges of racism, 
thereby allowing our inter-group relations to be poisoned and our attention to be diverted 
from real problems . . . .”); Dan Subotnik, Do Law Schools Mistreat Women Faculty? Or, Who’s 
Afraid of Virginia Woolf?, 44 AKRON L. REV. 867, 869 (2011) (responding to feminist theorists 
who argue that sexism limits opportunities of women in law schools and concluding that the 
“charges are almost entirely unproven” and that “perhaps for now, male faculty can lay down 
the burden of guilt for the long-term exclusion of women from the academy”); Dan Subotnik, 
The Duke Rape Case Five Years Later: Lessons for the Academy, the Media, and the Criminal Justice 
System, 45 AKRON L. REV. 883, 898–99 (2012) (describing critical race theorists as “modern 
day Don Quixotes [who] inﬂate their self-importance, feed their self-righteousness, under-
mine individual responsibility by promoting self-pity, impale innocents, and, in so doing, 
shred the social fabric”). 
156. Daniel Subotnik, What’s Wrong with Critical Race Theory?: Reopening the Case for Middle Class 
Values, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 681, 738 (1998) (dismissing racism as a cause for dispro-
portionate involvement of blacks in penal system and attributing this reality to the “aban-
don[ment] of the traditional family” and to the United States “having the highest rate of teen 
pregnancy in the industrialized world”). 
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enforcement: the possible inﬂuence of white supremacy on black punitive senti-
ment, geographical limitations of black political power, and the pervasiveness of 
antiblack racism as a motivator of punitiveness among whites. 
A. Social Psychology and Possible Explanations for Black Punitiveness 
For some readers, Forman’s observations might complicate arguments that 
link mass incarceration with white supremacist decision making. Because blacks 
endorsed aggressive policing and harsh punishments, something other than rac-
ism—such as a misguided reaction to fear—must have sparked the enactment of 
policies that gave rise to mass incarceration. The narratives Forman unearths, 
however, could also fortify antiracist accounts of U.S. criminal law and enforce-
ment. Social psychology research on implicit bias and other theories of human 
behavior, including social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarian-
ism, provide important context for understanding why some level of punitive-
ness among blacks could result from—rather than disprove—the existence of rac-
ism. Thus, this research could help to reveal the centrality of white supremacy 
to U.S. punitive sentiment, including punitiveness among blacks.
157
 
1. Implicit Bias and Out-Group Preferences 
Substantial cognitive psychology research ﬁnds that human mental pro-
cesses, thoughts, and behavior take place “largely outside conscious awareness, 
control, and intention.”
158
 Implicit bias describes the unconscious behavioral 
leanings that result from two important types of unconscious mental processes: 
“implicit attitudes” and “implicit stereotypes.”
159
 Implicit attitudes, which are 
 
157. This Section does not (and cannot) offer proof that racist constructs gave rise to punitiveness 
among blacks. Furthermore, even if the social psychology concepts analyzed in this Section 
could explain black punitiveness, this would not preclude other possible explanations. Racial 
inequality and mass incarceration are very complex social problems that are sustained by nu-
merous inﬂuences. Consequently, readers should not view this Review as foreclosing multiple 
explanations for black punitiveness. 
158. Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 427, 428 
(2007). 
159. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientiﬁc Foundations, 94 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 945, 947 (2006). 
the yale law journal 127:2388  2018 
2414 
produced by prior experiences, involve unconscious preferences regarding a par-
ticular “social object.”
160
 An unconscious and implicit stereotype is a “mental as-
sociation between a social group or category and a trait.”
161
 Legal scholars and 
other academics argue that pervasive implicit biases explain how racial, sexual, 
and other inequities persist in spite of cultural and legal norms that promote 
egalitarianism.
162
 
Implicit bias theory has broad implications for criminal law and enforcement 
policy and research. Implicit bias studies have found that whites tend to view 
people of color—particularly blacks—as more violent.
163
 For example, “shooter 
studies” test whether implicit racial biases can explain why police officers use 
lethal force against unarmed blacks to a much higher degree than unarmed 
whites.
164
 Participants in shooter studies watch a screen that projects images of 
persons of different racial backgrounds. The researchers instruct participants to 
press a button to shoot if they see a person holding a gun and not to shoot if the 
person is unarmed.
165
 Many of these studies demonstrate that participants, in-
cluding police officers, tend to shoot unarmed blacks at a much higher rate than 
unarmed whites.
166
 Other studies ﬁnd that race inﬂuences whether participants, 
 
160. Lane et al., supra note 158, at 429 (quoting Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit 
Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 8 (1995)). 
161. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 159, at 949. 
162. See, e.g., Greenwald & Krieger, supra note  159, at 961; Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1514 (2005). 
163. See, e.g., Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Rea-
sonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 405-06 (1991) (discussing a study that found participants 
more likely to rate behavior engaged in by blacks as “violent” and less likely to do so when 
whites engaged in the same behavior); id. at 406 (discussing a study that “found that both 
Black and White children tended to rate relatively innocuous behavior by Blacks as more 
threatening than similar behavior by Whites”). 
164. Lane et al., supra note 158, at 429-30; see also Hutchinson, supra note 9, at 39-40 (discussing 
shooter studies). 
165. Lane et al., supra note 158, at 429-30. 
166. See Hutchinson, supra note 9, at 40 n.105 (citing Lane et al., supra note 158, at 429-30) (“The 
data revealed systematic racial bias in shooting, with faster and more accurate responses to 
unarmed white targets and armed black targets compared with armed white targets and un-
armed black targets.”); see also R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimi-
nation and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1174 (2006) (“The 
shooting studies, conducted by several different groups of researchers, all found that shooting 
behavior differed based on the race of the ‘suspect.’ One ﬁnding was that images of unarmed 
Black men were more likely to be ‘shot’ than were images of unarmed White men, a result 
consistent with the shootings of unarmed Black men that have generated so much contro-
versy.” (citations omitted)); Kimberly Barsamian Kahn & Paul G. Davies, Differentially Dan-
gerous? Phenotypic Racial Stereotypicality Increases Implicit Bias Among Ingroup and Outgroup 
examining the social meaning of black punitiveness 
2415 
including persons of color, interpret observed behavior as aggressive or vio-
lent.
167
 Furthermore, some implicit bias research indicates that probation offic-
ers who score high on implicit racial bias measures tend to rate black offenders 
as having a greater risk of recidivism than similarly situated whites.
168
 These 
studies suggest that implicit racial bias could have a substantial effect on criminal 
law and enforcement.
169
 
Forman isolates fear as the primary motivation for black punitiveness, but 
antiblack stigma among blacks could also explain their support of aggressive 
crime policy. The social psychology concepts of out-group and in-group prefer-
ences can illuminate this point. Out-group preferences refer to an individual’s 
negative perception of persons from his or her social class and favorable impres-
sion of outside groups (e.g., blacks believing whites are smarter than blacks).
170
 
In-group preferences indicate positive attitudes regarding members of the indi-
vidual’s social class and negative impression of outsiders (e.g., whites favoring 
other whites over persons of color).
171
 Most of the existing research examines 
implicit biases among members of socially advantaged classes, but some studies 
analyze implicit biases among marginalized groups.
172
  This research reveals 
greater in-group preferences among members of privileged classes and greater 
 
Members, 14 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELS. 569, 577-79 (2010) (ﬁnding a positive 
correlation between darker racial phenotypes, negative stereotypes, and decisions to shoot). 
167. See Kwei Yung Lee, supra note 163, at 405-06. 
168. See Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent 
Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483 (2004). 
169. Although the idea that implicit bias impacts human behavior has wide support in academic 
literature, some scholars question this observation. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tet-
lock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006); Greg-
ory S. Parks, Jeffrey Rachlinski, & Richard Epstein, Implicit Bias and the 2008 Presidential Elec-
tion: Much Ado About Nothing?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 210, 216-20 (2008) 
(questioning the relevance of implicit bias) (remarks of Richard Epstein); see also 
Hutchinson, supra note 9, at 41-42 (discussing academic criticism of implicit bias research and 
responses to these critiques). 
170. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 159, at 959. 
171. See Lane et al., supra note 158, at 433. 
172. See, e.g., Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Be-
havioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 146 (2004) (“Initial investigations on the na-
ture of implicit prejudice and stereotypes focused entirely on attitudes and beliefs held by 
members of advantaged groups toward members of disadvantaged groups.”); id. at 149-51, 
160-62 (discussing studies); Leslie Ashburn-Nardo, Megan L. Knowles & Margo J. Monteith, 
Black Americans’ Implicit Racial Associations and Their Implications for Intergroup Judgment, 21 
SOC. COGNITION 61, 62 (2003) (observing that “[d]ecades of research have documented the 
negativity that many white Americans associate with black Americans” but that “[f]ar fewer 
studies have examined blacks’ own attitudes toward and evaluative associations regarding 
their own race”). 
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out-group preferences among members of socially disadvantaged groups.
173
 Alt-
hough researchers have not conclusively identiﬁed the cause of this disparity, 
they have theorized that out-group preferences among socially subordinate 
groups likely stem from the pervasiveness of negative stereotypes concerning 
their classes.
174
 Members of subordinate classes unconsciously accept the societal 
stigma of their own groups.
175
 
Although Forman does not signiﬁcantly examine the possibility that implicit 
racial bias might cause blacks to support harsh punitive measures, the existence 
of out-group preferences among blacks could provide additional context for For-
man’s ﬁndings and bolster antiracist explanations for mass incarceration.
176
 In-
deed, social psychology studies demonstrate that blacks hold some of the same 
implicit biases regarding blacks that scholars have observed among whites. For 
example, a leading shooter bias study found that, like their white counterparts, 
black participants “shot” armed blacks more quickly than armed whites and shot 
unarmed blacks more often than unarmed whites.
177
 Similarly, a 1980 study—
conducted when the surge in U.S. incarceration was relatively embryonic—
found that both black and white participants were more likely to view blacks as 
more violent or aggressive than whites.
178
 Other research shows that blacks ex-
hibit out-group preferences in noncriminal contexts by implicitly associating 
whiteness with greater intellectual capacity.
179
 If this research accurately captures 
the existence of implicit racial bias among signiﬁcant numbers of blacks, then 
black support for tough criminal justice policies could stem, at least in part, from 
exposure to antiblack stigma. This ﬁnding would strengthen the link between 
 
173. Dasgupta, supra note 172, at 149 (“Consistent with system justiﬁcation theory, a number of 
studies reveal outgroup favoritism (or sometimes, less in-group favoritism) in the case of dis-
advantaged groups, especially when people’s attitudes and beliefs are assessed using indirect 
measures rather than self-report measures.”). 
174. Id. at 148. 
175. Id. (“[F]or members of disadvantaged social groups, implicit liking for the ingroup may 
sometimes be attenuated by the cultural construal of their group . . . .”). 
176. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 12-13. 
177. Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity To Disambiguate Potentially 
Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1325 (2002). 
178. See H. Andrew Sagard & Janet Ward Schoﬁeld, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and White 
Children’s Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 
596 (1980) (ﬁnding a propensity among white and black children to evaluate the same be-
havior by white and black actors as more aggressive when the actor was black). 
179. Ashburn-Nardo et al., supra note 172, at 72-77 (ﬁnding a correlation between implicit out-
group bias and blacks’ preference for whites as partners for the completion of an intellectual 
project). 
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racism and mass incarceration made by antisubordination theorists. If black pu-
nitive attitudes reﬂect negative conceptions of blacks, then Forman’s research ﬁts 
comfortably within antiracist analysis of U.S. criminal law and enforcement. 
The “Martin Luther King speech”
180
 is just one example of how implicit ra-
cial bias could have shaped black punitive attitudes in the individuals Forman 
analyzes. To Forman, the King speech stands as a racial-equality justiﬁcation for 
black punitiveness. Facially, this is a reasonable conclusion. Nonetheless, implicit 
racial (and class) bias could also provide context for the speech. The judge’s as-
sertion that Forman’s client had squandered opportunities that civil rights activ-
ists obtained for him obscured the salience of racism and poverty in the 15-year-
old’s life, thus reducing his hardships to a series of ﬂawed individual choices. 
This reasoning strongly suggests that the judge implicitly (or, perhaps, explic-
itly) subscribed to racial and class stereotypes that depict blacks as lawbreakers
181
 
who prefer criminality over working hard to escape poverty.
182
 While it is im-
possible to determine exactly how the judge would have responded to white de-
fendants, it is clear that race shaped his treatment of the black defendant. If the 
defendant were white, the King speech would have had no rhetorical value. 
Viewed in a more complicated racial context, the King speech suggests the pos-
sible operation of implicit bias and the relevance of antiblack stigma to black 
punitive sentiment.
183
 Given the powerful impact of unconscious stereotypes on 
human behavior, legal scholars and social scientists should explore the potential 
inﬂuence of implicit racial bias on blacks in future research regarding race, crime, 
and punitiveness. 
 
180. See supra text accompanying notes 124-128. 
181. See Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial 
Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1580-82 (2013) (discussing stereotypes of black men). 
182. Christopher D. DeSante, Working Twice as Hard To Get Half as Far: Race, Work Ethic, and 
America’s Deserving Poor, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 342, 353-54 (2013) (ﬁnding that whites are more 
likely to conclude that poor blacks are lazy and undeserving of beneﬁts and less likely to hold 
such a view of poor whites). 
183. Cf. Bobo & Johnson, supra note 40, at 164 (“Among Blacks we ﬁnd that racial resentment 
increases support for the death penalty . . . .”); id. at 167 (“Among Blacks, those who deny the 
existence of racial bias, who worry most about crime, and who harbor racial resentments, are 
the most likely to support the crack vs. powder sentencing differential.”). 
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2. Social Dominance Orientation and Negative In-Group Attitudes 
Another social psychology concept—social dominance theory
184
—could po-
tentially explain punitiveness among some blacks. In their leading work on the 
subject, Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto observe that group-based hierarchy ex-
ists in all human societies.
185
 In hierarchical societies, dominant classes have ac-
cess to desirable resources, like high-quality schools, jobs, and medical care, 
while subordinate classes struggle to obtain important goods and services.
186
 
Social dominance theorists measure an individual’s commitment to group-based 
hierarchy by testing for “social dominance orientation” (SDO).
187
 Although so-
cial dominance theory has substantially inﬂuenced social science research, only 
a handful of legal scholars have engaged with this concept.
188
 Nevertheless, so-
cial dominance theory could provide a contextual framework for understanding 
punitive sentiment generally, as well as blacks’ endorsement of aggressive crim-
inal law and enforcement practices. 
Criminal law and enforcement implicate social dominance theory due to the 
potency of state authority. The enforcement of criminal law is one of the most 
powerful exercises of state authority.
189
 Criminal law and enforcement allow the 
state to deprive individuals of life, liberty, and property, subject to the constraints 
 
184. See generally JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY 
OF SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION (1999) (developing social dominance theory). 
185. Id. at 31. 
186. Id. at 31-32. 
187. Id. at 50, 61 (“SDO is deﬁned as a very general individual differences orientation expressing 
the value that people place on nonegalitarian and hierarchically structured relationships 
among social groups.”). 
188. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 9, at 46-56; Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Preventing Balkani-
zation or Facilitating Racial Domination: A Critique of the New Equal Protection, 22 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 1, 41-42 (2015); Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective Rather 
Than Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 657, 673-77 (2003); Michael Selmi, Understanding 
Discrimination in a “Post-Racial” World, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 833, 853 (2011); Sylvia R. Lazos 
Vargas, Deconstructing Homo[geneous] Americanus: The White Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and 
Its Exclusionary Effect, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1493, 1570-71 (1998). 
189. See Rex E. Lee & Richard G. Wilkins, An Analysis of Supplemental Jurisdiction and Abstention 
with Recommendations for Legislative Action, 1990 BYU L. REV. 321, 366-67 (1990) (describing 
“enforcement of state criminal law” as “perhaps the most important exercise of state sovereign 
prerogative”); Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 38 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149, 151 (2010) (“Punishment under law is a profound exercise of state 
power the meaning and justiﬁcation of which depend on the social and political institutions 
that authorize it.”); Sonja B. Starr, On the Role of Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis in Criminal Justice Policy: 
A Response to The Imprisoner’s Dilemma, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 97, 99 (2013) (“Incarcera-
tion . . . is one of the most profound exercises of state authority.”). 
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of due process.
190
 Because criminal law and enforcement subordinate persons of 
color, social dominance theory could help to shed light on the roots of U.S. pu-
nitive sentiment. Speciﬁcally, social dominance theory provides a psychological 
basis for understanding why U.S. crime policy continues to subordinate persons 
of color. In this vein, social dominance theorists argue that the racially oppressive 
nature of criminal law and enforcement exists in order to allow dominant classes 
to retain privileged access to high-value social resources and to deprive subordi-
nate groups of hierarchy-attenuating goods and services.
191
 
Furthermore, because SDO strongly correlates with individual approval of 
tough criminal law and punishment, including the death penalty and torture,
192
 
social dominance theory could potentially explain why some blacks support pu-
nitive policies that disproportionately harm other blacks. Although social domi-
nance research ﬁnds that members of dominant classes have higher SDO scores, 
studies also indicate that signiﬁcant numbers of people in subordinate groups, 
including racial minorities and women, have high SDO scores.
193
 In addition to 
backing tough criminal laws and punishment, high-SDO individuals tend to 
embrace negative stereotypes that portray people of color as disposed to crimi-
nality.
194
 Moreover, social psychology research ﬁnds that persons with high SDO 
scores can exhibit out-group or in-group preferences.
195
 Researchers in this ﬁeld 
 
190. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
191. SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 184, at 205 (arguing that criminal law and enforcement “func-
tion[] to protect and maintain the status, privilege, and power of dominants”). 
192. See Sidanius et al., supra note 17, at 445-46. 
193. See Shana Levin et al., Social Dominance Orientation and Intergroup Bias: The Legitimation of 
Favoritism for High-Status Groups, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 144, 145 (2002) (re-
viewing literature ﬁnding an out-group preference among subordinates with high SDO 
scores); Felicia Pratto & Andrew L. Stewart, Group Dominance and the Half-Blindness of Privi-
lege, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 28, 38 (2012) (ﬁnding higher SDO among European Americans than 
Hispanic Americans and African Americans). 
194. See Hutchinson, supra note 9, at 85 (discussing such ﬁndings). 
195. Levin et al., supra note 193, at 145 (“In this spirit, social dominance theory . . . has suggested 
that a basic desire for group-based forms of inequality and dominance also may give rise to 
intergroup bias.”). By contrast, persons in subordinate classes with high SDO scores have 
strong in-group preferences if they believe existing hierarchies are invalid. Id. at 147 (“In gen-
eral, studies in this area suggest that members of both high- and low-status groups tend to 
accept the hierarchical status quo—and consensually favor the high-status group—when the 
status distinction between the groups is believed to be legitimate.”); see also John T. Jost & 
Erik P. Thompson, Group-Based Dominance and Opposition to Equality as Independent Predictors 
of Self-Esteem, Ethnocentrism, and Social Policy Attitudes Among African Americans and European 
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contend that high-SDO scorers within subordinate groups will favor out-groups 
if they believe existing group hierarchies are legitimate.
196
 It may follow logically 
that high-SDO blacks who accept social hierarchy as valid would likely support 
policies—such as harsh criminal law and enforcement—that favor out-groups. 
Other social dominance scholarship connects SDO with punitiveness. For 
example, some research examines SDO among subordinate and advantaged 
criminal law professionals.
197
 One study conducted using a sample drawn from 
Los Angeles ﬁnds that police have higher levels of SDO than civilians and crim-
inal defense attorneys.
198
 The study, however, ﬁnds racial differences that are 
consistent with other relevant research. For example, white police officers have 
the highest SDO levels of all of the subject groups.
199
 While “minority”
200
 offic-
ers have lower SDO scores than white police, their scores exceed those of black 
and white civilians.
201
 Furthermore, this particular study ﬁnds that minority of-
ﬁcers have the highest punitive sentiment of all subject groups—although the 
researchers cannot explain this result.
202
 
 
Americans, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 209, 229-30 (2000) (ﬁnding a negative corre-
lation between opposition to egalitarian policies and in-group preferences among blacks). 
Researchers in this area ﬁnd two strands of SDO: desire to dominate and opposition to equal-
ity. The linkage between SDO and negative in-group perceptions among subordinate classes 
appears to reﬂect opposition to equality more than desire to dominate. See, e.g., Jost & 
Thompson, supra; Levin et al., supra note 193, at 147. 
196. See Levin et al., supra note 193, at 147 (“In general, studies in this area suggest that members 
of both high- and low-status groups tend to accept the hierarchical status quo—and consen-
sually favor the high-status group—when the status distinction between the groups is be-
lieved to be legitimate.”); id. at 155 (ﬁnding that “high SDO leads members of [low-status] 
groups to favor the high-status group in a system-justifying fashion only when social change 
is seen as impossible or unnecessary”). By contrast, persons in subordinate classes with high 
SDO scores have strong in-group preferences if they believe existing hierarchies are invalid. 
Id. at 147 (“[W]hen the status distinction is believed to be illegitimate, intergroup behavior is 
no longer under the inﬂuence of shared norms, and each group tends to follow its own inter-
ests. In practical terms, this implies continued ingroup bias among members of high-status 
groups and a shift from outgroup bias toward ingroup bias among members of low-status 
groups.” (citations omitted)). 
197. See, e.g., Jim Sidanius et al., Social Dominance Orientation, Hierarchy Attenuators and Hierarchy 
Enhancers: Social Dominance Theory and the Criminal Justice System, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 338, 344-45 (1994) (examining SDO among police officers, public defenders, jurors, 
and civilians). 
198. Id. at 348-49. 
199. Id. at 350. 
200. The study does not disaggregate ﬁndings for Blacks and Latinos. Instead, they are presented 
together as “minorities.” Id. 
201. Id. at 357. 
202. Id. 
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This research does not focus speciﬁcally on the issue Forman examines—
namely, 1970s-2000s punitiveness among Washington, D.C. blacks. Neverthe-
less, these ﬁndings could have important implications for analysis of black pu-
nitive sentiment. Consider, for example, a study Forman examines regarding at-
titudes among black and white police officers in Boston, Chicago, and 
Washington, D.C.
203
 Forman correctly observes that the study ﬁnds that “a sig-
niﬁcant minority of black officers . . . expressed antiblack attitudes.”
204
 In partic-
ular, the study ﬁnds that twenty-eight percent of black officers in black precincts 
were “highly prejudiced” or “prejudiced.”
205
 Forman also analyzes statements 
made by black officers who participated in the study.
206
 One black officer who 
worked in a predominately black precinct told a researcher, “I’m talking to you 
as a Negro, and I’m telling you these [blacks] are savages. And they’re real dirty. 
We were never rich, but my mother kept us and our home clean.”
207
 Another 
black officer stated that “[t]here have always been jobs for Negroes, but the f— 
people are too stupid to go out and get an education.”
208
 Statements made by a 
black police officer in another study Forman discusses follow a similar pattern. 
That officer, who worked in Baltimore, said that “[ghetto residents] are lazy. L-
A-Z-Y. Waiting in the cheese line. Being poor is no excuse for being ignorant. I 
made it in this country. It can be done. But you got to work for it.”
209
 
These officers’ comments reﬂect antiblack sentiment,
210
 as Forman observes. 
The statements, however, also indicate that the officers view the existing social 
hierarchy as legitimate. Blacks are poor because they choose not to pursue an 
education—not because racial subordination limits opportunity. Also, blacks live 
 
203. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 108. The study Forman cites is Donald J. Black & Albert J. Reiss, Jr., 
Patterns of Behavior in Police and Citizen Transactions, 2 STUD. CRIME & L. ENFORCEMENT 135 
(1966). 
204. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 108. 
205. Id. (citing Black & Reiss, supra note 203, at tbl.25). 
206. Id. 
207. Id. (citing Black & Reiss, supra note 203, at 137). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 265 n.130 (citing Peter C. Moskos, Two Shades of Blue: Black and White in the Blue Broth-
erhood, 8 LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVE F. 57, 74 (2008)). The black officer was describing 
his view of Baltimore’s “ghetto residents.” See Moskos, supra, at 74. 
210. The officers’ comments draw upon pervasive antiblack stereotypes. See FORMAN, supra note 
1, at 108 (discussing antiblack attitudes among black police officers); see, e.g., Marci Bounds 
Littleﬁeld, The Media as a System of Racialization: Exploring Images of African American Women 
and the New Racism, 51 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 675, 679 (2008) (analyzing “common stereotypes of 
African Americans as savages” in U.S. popular culture); Lee Sigelman & Steven A. Tuch, 
Blacks’ Perceptions of Whites’ Stereotypes of Blacks, PUB. OPINION Q., Spring 1997, at 87, 88 (an-
alyzing stereotypes of blacks as “lazy, poor, violent, unintelligent, and welfare dependent”). 
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in poor housing conditions because they are “savages” who lack the capacity or 
desire to improve their circumstances—not because racial subordination de-
prives them of the necessary resources for social advancement, such as jobs, ed-
ucation, and valuable social networks. The black officers subscribe to negative 
in-group attitudes and view the existing social hierarchy as legitimate; this com-
bination correlates positively with SDO.
211
 When high-SDO subordinates dis-
favor members of their in-group and perceive group-based inequality as just, 
they also tend to oppose egalitarian policies designed to redistribute important 
resources to their group.
212
 Furthermore, because police officers—including ra-
cial minorities—have higher SDO scores than civilians and because SDO 
strongly correlates with punitiveness, social dominance theory could likely help 
to explain why some black police officers engage in and support aggressive law-
enforcement practices that harm blacks. In order to develop a more comprehen-
sive analysis of punitiveness among blacks, researchers should consider whether 
SDO inﬂuences black attitudes regarding crime and punishment. The forgoing 
analysis does not prove that SDO shaped black punitiveness in twentieth-cen-
tury Washington, D.C. (or that it does so today), but rigorous academic engage-
ment with social dominance research could provide context for explaining the 
dimensions of black punitiveness. The relationship among SDO, group-based 
inequality, racism, and punitiveness provides a compelling basis for employing 
social dominance theory to explicate the inﬂuences of punitive sentiment, in-
cluding punitiveness among blacks. 
 
211. See Levin et al., supra note 193, at 147. 
212. See supra text accompanying notes 195-196. Some scholars would argue that acceptance and 
promotion of status quo racial inequality as a legitimate social order are essential dimensions 
of the “new” racism. See, e.g., EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS 2 (4th ed. 
2013) (arguing that “contemporary racial inequality is reproduced through ‘new racism’ prac-
tices that are subtle, institutional, and apparently nonracial”); William M. Carter, Jr., The 
Thirteenth Amendment and Pro-Equality Speech, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1855, 1857–58 (2012) (“The 
old racism of state-sponsored segregation and avowedly bigoted private action has thankfully 
diminished. However, it has largely been supplanted by the ‘new racism’ of systemic inequal-
ity, unconscious bias, and more subtle forms of racial exclusion.”); Colin Wayne Leach, 
Against the Notion of a “New Racism”, 15 J. COMMUNITY APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 432, 433 (2005) 
(“That racial discrimination and racist political movements persist in societies that have 
achieved de jure equality has led many to suggest that a ‘new racism’ serves as an ideological 
basis of contemporary white investment in racial inequality.”). 
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3. Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Support for Law and Order Policies 
Forman’s research implicates a third social psychology category: right-wing 
authoritarianism (RWA), a model developed by Canadian psychologist Bob Al-
temeyer in his work The Authoritarian Specter.
213
 RWA consists of three attitudi-
nal measures: 
1. Authoritarian submission: a high degree of submission to the author-
ities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in 
which one lives. 
2. Authoritarian aggression: a general aggressiveness, directed against 
various persons, that is perceived to be sanctioned by established author-
ities. 
3. Conventionalism: a high degree of adherence to the social conventions 
that are perceived to be endorsed by society and its established authori-
ties.
214
 
The second attitudinal cluster—authoritarian aggression—relates most 
closely to individual support for harsh punitive measures. Aggression involves 
intentional inﬂiction of harm, which is authoritarian when “it is accompanied by 
the belief that proper authority approves it or that it will help preserve such au-
thority.”
215
 Because right-wing authoritarians uncritically submit to the legiti-
macy of “established authorities,”
216
 they support inﬂexible application of puni-
tive measures.
217
  As Altemeyer observes, “[r]ight-wing authoritarians are 
predisposed to control the behavior of others through punishment . . . . They 
deplore leniency in the courts and believe penal reform just encourages criminals 
to continue being lawless.”
218
 Furthermore, right-wing authoritarians subscribe 
 
213. BOB ALTEMEYER, THE AUTHORITARIAN SPECTER (1996). Altemeyer’s model builds upon THE-
ODOR W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950). 
214. ALTEMEYER, supra note 213, at 6 (citation omitted). Altemeyer created a thirty-item attitude 
scale to measure RWA personality. See id. at 12-15. 
215. Id. at 10. 
216. Id. at 9. 
217. Id. at 10. 
218. Id.; see also John S. Carroll et al., Sentencing Goals, Causal Attributions, Ideology, and Personality, 
52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 107, 108 (1987) (“Authoritarians are usually found to have 
a more punitive attitude toward crime and to give harsher sentences.”); Ian R. McKee & N.T. 
Feather, Revenge, Retribution, and Values: Social Attitudes and Punitive Sentencing, 21 SOC. JUST. 
RES. 138, 141 (2008) (“One personality variable that has demonstrated a consistent association 
with punitive and retributive reactions to criminal offenses is RWA.”). 
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to traditional views regarding sexuality and gender, which lead them to support 
policies that subordinate and discriminate against LGBT individuals.
219
 In addi-
tion, right-wing authoritarianism is highly correlated with prejudicial views of 
racial minority groups.
220
 
Although Forman’s research does not discuss RWA, some research indicates 
that this attitudinal cluster exists among blacks.
221
 Furthermore, some of the an-
ecdotes that Forman narrates in his research suggest the possible inﬂuence of 
RWA upon black attitudes regarding criminal behavior. In particular, statements 
of Washington, D.C. law enforcement officials and politicians regarding the 
1996 antidrug policy “Operation Clean Sweep” indicate strong support for ag-
gressive policing and punishment commonly associated with RWA. For exam-
ple, police chief Maurice Turner said at a press conference announcing the pro-
gram that, “We’re going to arrest every one of those [SOBs] that we can get.”
222
 
Furthermore, Mayor Barry boasted about the program: “If you think it’s hot to-
 
219.  ALTEMEYER, supra note 213, at 31.  
220. Id. 
221. See, e.g., Patrick C. L. Heaven & Ruth L. Greene, African Americans’ Stereotypes of Whites: Re-
lationships With Social Dominance Orientation, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, and Group Iden-
tity, 141 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 141, 141-43 (2001) (ﬁnding SDO and RWA among blacks but ﬁnding 
a weak linkage between these psychological concepts and antiwhite stereotypes among 
blacks); Bernard E. Whitley Jr. et al., Differences in Black and White American College Students’ 
Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men, 64 SEX ROLES 299, 304 (2011) (ﬁnding higher RWA 
among blacks in the sample); cf. Kevin O. Cokley et al., Predicting Student Attitudes About Ra-
cial Diversity and Gender Equity, 3 J. DIVERSITY HIGHER ED. 187, 192 (2010) (ﬁnding the exist-
ence of RWA across a racially diverse sample that included blacks but presenting results as 
ethnic majority and minority). The extent of RWA among blacks and the implications of this 
possibility remain substantially unexplored in academic literature. 
222. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 168. Some research ﬁnds higher RWA among police officers and 
criminal justice majors (who often become police officers). See, e.g., Juliette Gatto et al., Prej-
udice in the Police: On the Processes Underlying the Effects of Selection and Group Socialisation, 40 
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 252, 259 (2010) (“Newly recruited police officers displayed greater lev-
els of both SDO and RWA than participants in the control group . . . .”); id. at 264 (“In other 
words, one of the reasons why police officers, when entering the police force, are signiﬁcantly 
more prejudiced (towards prisoners) than are the standard population, may be because they 
are strongly oriented towards RWA.”); Stephen S. Owen & Kenneth Wagner, The Specter of 
Authoritarianism Among Criminal Justice Majors, 19 J. CRIM. JUST. ED. 30, 47 (2008) (“Criminal 
justice majors, males, and lower-division students have higher mean RWA scores than non-
criminal justice majors, females, and upper-division students. Upon further examination, 
male criminal justice majors (overall, at the lower division, and at the upper division) have 
the highest mean RWA scores.”). 
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day, we’re going to make it hotter on drug dealers and pushers who are destroy-
ing the minds of our young people.”
223
 Barry also bragged about militaristic wea-
ponry that the city purchased for the police department.
224
 These comments im-
plicate “authoritarian aggression” and indicate support for rigid law and order 
approaches that correlate with the punitive aspects of RWA.
225
 
Additionally, the history of other activists discussed by Forman reveals atti-
tudes indicative of RWA. Consider, for example, Douglas Moore, who helped to 
defeat marijuana decriminalization in Washington, D.C.
226
 A closer examination 
of Moore, who had a black nationalist background,
227
 indicates that he was mo-
tivated by attitudes suggestive of RWA. For example, Moore’s political history 
includes troubling stances on gay rights. Indeed, Moore lost a 1978 bid for city 
council chair after he decried “fascist faggots,” which caused many voters to sup-
port his opponent.
228
 Furthermore, Moore backed removing protections for gays 
and lesbians from local civil rights law.
229
 Numerous studies link RWA to anti-
LGBT attitudes because persons who exhibit this personality cluster respond 
very negatively to departures from traditional morality.
230
 
Moore’s political rhetoric also indicates that he might have subscribed to 
problematic views of poor blacks. For example, Moore explained that black 
youths who saw him drive a Cadillac might learn that they could make money 
selling “coal” rather than “coke,” referring to the coal-trading business he 
founded.
231
 This statement could indicate that Moore dismissed the structural 
constraints that lock poor blacks in poverty and evince possible contempt for 
their plight. Ultimately, it is impossible to draw any ﬁrm conclusions regarding 
Moore’s racial attitudes from the limited historical resources in a Review. None-
theless, the parallels between Moore’s attitudes and RWA demonstrate that 
scholars should consider how RWA might inﬂuence black punitive sentiment. 
 
223. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 168. 
224. Id. 
225. See ALTEMEYER, supra note 213, at 10 (discussing punitiveness and RWA). 
226. See supra text accompanying notes 62-68. 
227. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
228. See Milton Coleman, Washington’s Gay Vote, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 1979), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/04/21/washingtons-gay-vote/bcd52b24-f3eb 
-45a3-908b-d10e1956775a [http://perma.cc/D8RU-NASV]. 
229. Sandra Evans, The New, Conservative Douglas Moore, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 1986), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1986/09/05/the-new-conservative-douglas-moore
/59252267-1c58-40ab-a690-0d40153f3834 [http://perma.cc/633Z-DS6N]. 
230. ALTEMEYER, supra note 213, at 31. 
231. See id. 
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Although the racial dimensions of RWA are clear for whites, researchers have 
not meaningfully explored this factor in blacks. Nonetheless, because RWA cor-
relates so strongly with punitiveness, researchers—particularly those who em-
ploy social psychology to illuminate legal problems—should consider how 
RWA, including its association with antiblack prejudice, might inﬂuence black 
punitiveness. If right-wing authoritarianism exists among blacks and leads to 
out-group preferences, then this psychological category could explain why some 
blacks desired punitive measures that contributed to racially disparate mass in-
carceration policies. Indeed, many of Forman’s observations regarding black 
Washingtonians’ arguments in favor of strict punitive measures mirror the ide-
ological commitments of right-wing authoritarians that Altemeyer’s ground-
breaking research identiﬁes. Individuals motivated by RWA oppose “leniency in 
the courts”
232
 and object to “penal reform”
233
 on the grounds that this would 
encourage criminality. Forman’s research uncovers similar attitudes among 
blacks. For example, Forman observes that Washington, D.C. blacks frequently 
objected to perceived leniency among judges.
234
 Carl Rowan, a prominent black 
journalist, offered strong criticism of courts in a provocative column titled Lock-
ing Up Thugs Is Not Vindictive.
235
 Rowan argued that judges allowed violent 
criminals to “terrorize minority communities again and again.”
236
 Furthermore, 
black ministers opposed liberalization of marijuana laws because doing so would 
presumably lead to a host of social harms, including criminality.
237
 The sym-
metry between the justiﬁcations for punitiveness among some Washington, 
D.C. blacks and right-wing authoritarian attitudes toward crime warrants 
greater examination by scholars. If RWA explains why a signiﬁcant number of 
blacks endorse harsh punishment as social policy and if RWA among blacks 
causes out-group (or pro-white) preferences, these relationships would suggest 
that white supremacy informs some blacks’ punitive attitudes. Accordingly, 
RWA provides yet another possible contextual basis for understanding punitive-
ness among blacks. Analyzing this psychological category could provide a con-
ceptual bridge that links Forman’s work with antisubordination accounts of U.S. 
criminal law and enforcement. 
 
232. Id. at 10. 
233. Id. 
234. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 127 (discussing critiques of the court system, including the percep-
tion of leniency). 
235. Id. at 128-29 (citing Carl T. Rowan, Locking Up Thugs Is Not Vindictive, WASH. STAR (Apr. 23, 
1976)). 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 39. 
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B. The Empirical Limits of Forman’s Findings 
1. Washington, D.C. as an Exceptional Site of Black Political Power 
Although Forman persuasively argues that blacks in Washington, D.C. used 
their political power to implement aggressive anticrime policies, this observation 
does not describe the reality of blacks’ political power throughout the United 
States. Unlike in most of the country, blacks constituted a political majority in 
Washington, D.C.
238
 During the 1980s, when the city’s criminal law and en-
forcement policies became far more punitive, blacks controlled the city council, 
and the city had a black mayor.
239
 Furthermore, the city appointed its ﬁrst black 
chief of police in 1978.
240
 Elsewhere in the United States, black political control 
over criminal law and enforcement was not, and continues not to be, as consist-
ently strong. Furthermore, while blacks exercised substantial political power in 
Washington, D.C. and in other U.S. urban cities, they constituted a minority 
among individuals with great inﬂuence over punitive policies—including legis-
lators, prosecutors, judges, and voters. Thus, blacks played a less substantial role 
in the rise of mass incarceration than Locking Up Our Own might suggest to some 
readers. 
 a. Blacks as a Political Minority in State Legislatures and Congress 
Several factors limit the ability of blacks to impact criminal policies nation-
wide. First, blacks invariably constitute minorities in state legislatures, which are 
largely responsible for enacting state criminal statutes and for funding policing, 
prosecution, and incarceration. A 2015 study by the National Conference of State 
Legislatures found that only nine percent of state legislators are black, despite 
the fact that blacks comprise thirteen percent of the population.
241
 Blacks’ polit-
ical underrepresentation extends to Congress as well. Only three blacks are 
members of the Senate, while only forty-eight blacks occupy seats in the House 
 
238. Id. at 18-19. 
239. Id. 
240. See Metropolitan Police Dep’t, Burtell M. Jefferson, D.C. GOV’T, http://mpdc.dc.gov/page
/burtell-m-jefferson [http://perma.cc/LP77-QL4U]. 
241. Who We Elect: An Interactive Graphic, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (2015), http://www.ncsl
.org/research/about-state-legislatures/who-we-elect-an-interactive-graphic.aspx [http://
perma.cc/7A8Q-EFQP]. 
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of Representatives. Thus, only ﬁfty-one of the 541 members of Congress are 
black—and this number represents the largest in U.S. history.
242
 
b. Blacks’ Underrepresentation Among State Executives 
Blacks are also greatly underrepresented among state executives, who enforce 
criminal policies. The disproportionately low number of black state executives 
limits the extent to which blacks could be complicit in enforcing criminal policies 
and carrying out mass incarceration. Only four blacks have ever served as gover-
nors.
243
 One of those—Pinckney Pinchback—held office for just 35 days during 
Reconstruction.
244
 And, of course, only one black person has served as President 
of the United States.
245
 Prosecutors are also disproportionately white, demon-
strating that much of this nation’s prosecutorial policy is shaped by whites, not 
blacks. Further, it is important to note that even in Washington, D.C., the pros-
ecutor who enforces major criminal laws, including all felonies and serious mis-
demeanors, is not elected by the city’s voters. Instead, the U.S. Attorney for the 
District of Columbia, who is appointed by the president, prosecutes all federal 
and serious local crimes in the city.
246
And while Washington, D.C.’s Attorney 
General oversees the prosecution of petty offenses, until 2014 the city’s mayor, 
rather than voters, selected individuals to serve in this position.
247
 These facts, 
 
242. See JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RES. SERV., R44762, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 115TH CONGRESS: 
A PROFILE 7 (2018). 
243. Anna Brown & Sara Atske, PEW RES. CTR., Blacks Have Made Gains in U.S. Political Leadership, 
but Gaps Remain (June 28, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/28/blacks
-have-made-gains-in-u-s-political-leadership-but-gaps-remain [http://perma.cc/S45V 
-F63J]. 
244. Id. 
245. Adam Nagourney, Obama Elected President as Racial Barrier Falls, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/05/us/politics/05elect.html [http://perma.cc/BYC6 
-5SFG]. 
246. Irvin Nathan, Opinion, Let D.C.’s Elected Attorney General Prosecute D.C. Crimes, WASH.  
POST (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/let-dcs-elected-attorney 
-general-prosecute-dc-crimes/2016/02/12/91ded204-c91c-11e5-88ff-e2d1b4289c2f_story
.html [http://perma.cc/B2EA-5THJ] (“In every city except the District, the prosecutions of 
serious local crimes—from murder to consumer fraud—are handled by prosecutors either 
elected or appointed by elected local officials. But in the District, all felonies and some serious 
misdemeanors are prosecuted by the U.S. attorney’s office, whose chief is appointed by the 
president and is not accountable to D.C. citizens.”). 
247. T. Rees Shapiro & Mike DeBonis, Karl Racine Wins First-Ever Race for D.C. Attorney General, 
WASH. POST. (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-voters 
-set-to-choose-their-ﬁrst-elected-attorney-general-tuesday/2014/11/04/d06e9160-6141 
-11e4-8b9e-2ccdac31a031_story.html [http://perma.cc/QYW3-NC2J]. 
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to some extent, diminish black electoral control over the prosecution of crime in 
Washington, D.C. 
Black political control of prosecution is substantially weaker in other juris-
dictions. A 2015 study compiled by the Reﬂective Democracy Campaign, for ex-
ample, found that ninety-ﬁve percent of elected prosecutors in the United States 
are white and eighty-three percent are male.
248
 Just one percent of U.S. elected 
prosecutors are women of color.
249
 Considering these numbers in light of pros-
ecutorial power raises serious questions about the extent to which blacks con-
tributed to the policies and practices that expanded the U.S. carceral state. Pros-
ecutors have an enormous amount of power; they can charge an individual, 
determine the level of the charges, use deferred adjudication or other diversion-
ary programs, negotiate plea agreements, and pursue available sentencing en-
hancements.
250
 Not only do all of these choices rest within the scope of prosecu-
torial authority, but they are also all discretionary—prosecutors have full 
discretion to make the choices that determine whether an individual is prose-
cuted, receives a favorable plea agreement, or faces the maximum available sen-
tence. Furthermore, head prosecutors, almost all of whom are elected, greatly 
inﬂuence the policies for the offices they manage.
251
 
Typically, prosecutors can choose from many different charges for a single 
set of facts.
252
 The proliferation of criminal offenses and correspondingly higher 
sentences in state penal codes give prosecutors a tremendous amount of leverage 
 
248. Justice for All*?, WOMEN DONORS NETWORK, http://wholeads.us/justice [http://perma.cc
/VLA8-DGAJ]. None of these studies indicates that the number of black elected prosecutors 
is lower today than it was in the 1970s. Given the increase in the number of black attorneys 
over time, that result would be counterintuitive. See Carla D. Pratt, Sisters in Law School:  
Black Women Lawyers’ Struggle for Advancement, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1777, 1780-81 (“Ad-
mittedly, since the 1970s there has been steady improvement in the number of black women 
becoming lawyers. In the two decades between 1970 and 1990, the number of black women 
lawyers increased dramatically from 446 to over 11,000.”); Diversity in Law Firms, U.S.  
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (2003), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/reports 
/diversitylaw [http://perma.cc/CK46-RPKS ] (showing an increase in the percentage of 
black attorneys in large ﬁrms between 1975 and 2002 and among law school graduates be-
tween 1982 and 2002).  
249. Amita Kelly, Does It Matter That 95 Percent of Elected Prosecutors Are White?, NPR (July 8, 2015), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/07/08/420913118/does-it-matter-that-95 
-of-elected-prosecutors-are-white [http://perma.cc/62CP-7M6M] (citing Justice for All*?, 
supra note 248). 
250. See Angela J. Davis, The Prosecution of Black Men, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN 178-83 (Angela 
J. Davis ed., 2017) (discussing prosecutorial discretion). 
251. Prosecutors are elected in forty-six states. See PFAFF, supra note 3, at 128. 
252. Id. at 129. 
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over defendants. Prosecutors can use the threat of a higher charge—and poten-
tial sentence—to pressure defendants into a plea agreement. Empirical research 
indicates that defendants plead guilty in the vast majority of felony cases that go 
into prosecution.
253
 
Prosecutors have used their power over charging decisions to play a signiﬁ-
cant role in mass incarceration. From 1990 to 2007, the number of prosecutors 
in the United States increased by ﬁfty percent, even though the rates of violent 
and property-related crimes dropped thirty-ﬁve percent.
254
 These prosecutors 
used their broad discretion to ﬁle more felony cases; as criminal law scholar John 
Pfaff has observed, the number of felony cases rose substantially between 1994 
and 2008.
255
 Thus, even as crime rates declined, the number of incarcerated in-
dividuals increased sharply, due in large part to prosecutors charging defendants 
with more serious crimes.
256
 Although prosecutors played a major role in creat-
ing mass incarceration, demographic data suggests white prosecutors were far 
more inﬂuential in this process. 
c. Blacks’ Underrepresentation Among Judges 
Blacks are also underrepresented among state and federal judges. For exam-
ple, although thirteen percent of the U.S. population is black,
257
 just seven per-
cent of state judges are black.
258
 The severe underrepresentation of black judges 
in the state court system is particularly important because eighty-seven percent 
of prisoners in state systems are black.
259
 Meanwhile, eleven percent of federal 
judges are black.
260
 Forman discusses the punitive attitudes of black judges in 
 
253. Id. at 132 (citing Thomas H. Cohen & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Felony Defendants in Large Urban 
Counties, 2006, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 10 (May 2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf
/fdluc06.pdf [http://perma.cc/B9BZ-8LAS]). 
254. Id. at 129. 
255. Id. at 72 (documenting a forty percent increase in Pfaff ’s sample). 
256. Id. 
257. 2010 Census Shows America’s Diversity, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www 
.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb11-cn125.html [http://perma.cc
/39FS-J2R5]. 
258. Michele L. Jawando & Allie Anderson, Racial and Gender Diversity Sorely Lacking in America’s 
Courts, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 15, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.americanprogress
.org/issues/courts/news/2016/09/15/144287/racial-and-gender-diversity-sorely-lacking-in 
-americas-courts [http://perma.cc/376E-BX9P]. 
259. PFAFF, supra note 3, at 13. 
260. Id. 
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Washington, D.C.,
261
 but as a group, black judges have not been able to exercise 
a tremendous amount of power within criminal law and enforcement relative to 
whites. The relatively small number of black judges in the United States limits 
the impact of their decisions on the overall level of incarceration. While black 
judges have undoubtedly sentenced individuals to prison, their collective contri-
bution to mass incarceration is constrained by their numbers. 
2. Empirical Research on Blacks’ Opinions Regarding Crime and 
Punishment 
While Forman correctly observes that blacks in Washington, D.C., favored 
implementation of punitive policies, it is important to contextualize this support. 
Although empirical research conﬁrms Forman’s general observations regarding 
black punitiveness in the lead-up to mass incarceration, these studies also indi-
cate that white support increased during this period and that white preference 
for strong law and order policies consistently exceeded black support.
262
 
 
a. Blacks, Legitimacy of Police, and Punishment 
Studies reveal differing views regarding the police among people of color and 
whites.
263
 Relative to whites, blacks distrust police and believe that officers dis-
criminate on the basis of race. They also believe that the legal system treats them 
unfairly, and they oppose harsh measures like the death penalty, supporting re-
habilitation over inﬂexible punishment.
264
  Furthermore, relative to whites, 
blacks strongly support public investments that could alleviate poverty, one of 
the primary causes of criminal behavior.
265
 Thus, while Forman correctly ob-
serves that many blacks, like whites, endorsed stiff penalties for criminals during 
 
261. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 3-8. 
262. Ramirez, supra note 39, at 352. 
263. See supra text accompanying notes 141-143. 
264. See Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Race and Punishment: Racial Perceptions of Crime and Support for  
Punitive Policies, SENT’G PROJECT (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.sentencingproject.org 
/publications/race-and-punishment-racial-perceptions-of-crime-and-support-for-punitive 
-policies [http://perma.cc/2LWG-DNWX]; Black, White, and Blue: Americans’ Attitudes on 
Race and Police, ROPER CTR., http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/black-white-blue-americans 
-attitudes-race-police [http://perma.cc/6SU8-GC8Z]. 
265. See David Lauter, How Do Americans View Poverty? Many Blue-Collar Whites, Key to Trump, 
Criticize Poor People as Lazy and Content To Stay on Welfare, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2016), http://
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periods of heightened violent crime, empirical studies reveal that there are sub-
stantial racial differences. 
Black punitiveness has consistently been lower than white punitiveness, in-
cluding during the periods discussed in Forman’s book. In line with Forman’s 
ﬁndings, research on punitiveness conﬁrms that black punitiveness increased 
substantially for nearly twenty years beginning in the mid-1970s.
266
 This in-
crease coincided with rising punitive sentiment among the general public.
267
 
Nonetheless, even as blacks’ punitiveness increased, it lagged far behind the 
measure among whites.
268
 Furthermore, since the mid-1990s, black support for 
punitive policies has decreased dramatically.
269
 Although this decline follows 
general attitudes, black punitiveness remains much lower than the same measure 
among whites.
270
 Available data shows that during the new millennium, with 
violent crime lower than it has been since 1970, blacks have exhibited a strong 
distrust of policing, disdain for high incarceration, and disapproval of harsh sen-
tencing.
271
 Additionally, blacks generally support the Black Lives Matter Move-
ment, which opposes aggressive policing and the expanded U.S. carceral state.
272
 
Polls indicate that fewer than half of whites, by contrast, hold a favorable view 
of this movement and its goals.
273
 
This data provides context for understanding black punitiveness. Blacks 
have not only supported a mixture of social welfare policies, along with strong 
law-enforcement responses rooted in the fear of crime, but they have also been 
consistently less punitive than whites and far more concerned with racial dis-
crimination by the state. This remains true even if some blacks, as this Review 
 
www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-pol-poverty-poll [http://perma.cc/F5N6-VQ8U] (de-
scribing more support for government anti-poverty programs among blacks and Latinos than 
whites). 
266. See Ramirez, supra note 39, at 352. Ramirez measures punitiveness across four different cate-
gories, including support for death penalty, harsher sentencing by courts, expanding author-
ity of law enforcement, and increased expenditures to toughen law enforcement. See id. at 336-
42. 
267. Id. at 352. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. 
271. See sources cited supra note 264. 
272. See Juliana Menasce Horowitz & Gretchen Livingston, How Americans View the Black Lives 
Matter Movement, PEW RES. CTR. (July 8, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank
/2016/07/08/how-americans-view-the-black-lives-matter-movement [http://perma.cc
/6346-ZADW]. 
273. See id. 
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argues, might support anticrime measures due to racial bias. It appears that ra-
cial-justice concerns mitigate black support for harsh punitive measures. By con-
trast, among whites, racism strongly correlates with increased punitive senti-
ment.
274
  Generally, whites have greater political power to enforce their 
perspectives. Taken together, these ﬁndings undermine any attempt to discount 
racism as a cause of mass incarceration and strongly suggest that reform efforts 
that do not include antiracist goals will likely have limited, if any, success. 
b. Black Politicians, Crime, and Punishment 
Moving beyond Forman’s work to a wider examination of black attitudes al-
lows for a more nuanced view of black politicians and their approaches to crime. 
For example, a study of 135 cities, which covers the same time period studied by 
Forman, ﬁnds that municipalities with black mayors were more likely to imple-
ment policies that establish civilian control over police departments.
275
 Further-
more, research on 100 U.S. urban areas during the same period ﬁnds a negative 
relationship between the rate of arrest of blacks for violent crimes and the per-
centage of blacks living in the city; this pattern is stronger in cities that also had 
black mayors and predominately black city councils.
276
 
Although blacks represent a minority of lawmakers nationwide, Forman cor-
rectly observes that they have supported draconian anticrime measures.
277
 For 
example, twenty-four of the thirty-eight members of the Congressional Black 
Caucus (CBC) voted for the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
of 1994,
278
 which has been highlighted by some legal scholars as a leading cause 
of mass incarceration, at least for the thirteen percent of inmates who are in fed-
eral custody.
279
 
 
274. Bobo & Johnson, supra note 40, at 171-72 (“[T]he most consistent predictor of criminal justice 
policy attitudes is, in fact, a form of racial prejudice. While racial resentment does not ever 
explain a large share of the variation in any of the attitudes we have measured, it is the most 
consistently inﬂuential of the variables outside of race classiﬁcation itself.”); Green et al., supra 
note 40, at 444-45. 
275. See Grace Hall Saltzstein, Black Mayors and Police Policies, 51 J. POL. 525, 541 (1989). 
276. Thomas D. Stucky, The Conditional Effects of Race and Politics on Social Control: Black Violent 
Crime Arrests in Large Cities, 1970 to 1990, 49 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 22 (2012). 
277. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 204-05 (discussing the evolution of black congressional opinion on 
drug laws). 
278. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 120005, 108 Stat. 1796, 2022-23 (1994) (codiﬁed as amended in scat-
tered sections of the U.S. Code). 
279. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 6-7; Yolanda Young, Analysis: Black Leaders Supported Clinton’s 
Crime Bill, NBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2016, 11:33 AM ET), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk
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Prior to the 1994 Act, black voting on federal crime statutes showed more 
mixed results, including far less support among black members of Congress than 
among all federal lawmakers. For example, over two decades before the passage 
of the 1994 legislation, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and 
Prevention Act of 1970,
280
 which created several new classes of drug crimes and 
penalties.
281
 Two members of the CBC voted against the bill, representing one-
third of the overall House opposition to the legislation. Furthermore, ﬁve mem-
bers did not vote at all. Only three CBC members supported the measure—rep-
resenting roughly one percent of the favorable House votes for the bill.
282
 These 
facts support the general ﬁnding of lower levels of support for punitive policies 
among blacks. This additional context can reconcile any perceived conﬂict be-
tween Forman’s research and antiracist accounts of U.S. criminal law and en-
forcement. 
c. Black Police Officers 
Although Forman makes a persuasive case regarding the role black police 
played in the arrest of other blacks, additional research presents a more compli-
cated picture of black policing. In particular, while Forman cites studies indicat-
ing antiblack racism among some black police officers, he concedes that the re-
search indicates greater racial prejudice among white police.
283
 Furthermore, 
other research indicates that in cities with black political leadership, police offic-
ers actually engage in fewer arrests. A study of every U.S. city with a population 
of at least 100,000 ﬁnds that maintenance-order arrests, a component of broken-
 
/analysis-black-leaders-supported-clinton-s-crime-bill-n552961 [http://perma.cc/PEB3 
-NAEN]. 
280. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970). 
281. Id. 
282. These ﬁgures were derived from a list of black Congress members and the roll call for each 
bill. History, Art & Archives, Black-American Representatives and Senators by Congress, 1870–
Present, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Jan. 23, 2008), http://history.house.gov/Exhibi-
tions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Data/Black-American-Representatives-and 
-Senators-by-Congress [http://perma.cc/GY5P-6WBV] (showing a historical list of black 
members of Congress); To Pass H.R. 18583, Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
Act Of 1970, GOVTRACK (2004), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/91-1970/h355 
[http://perma.cc/F3ZK-KT55] (showing the votes on the bill by representative). The black 
members of the House of Representatives in 1970 were: William Dawson, Adam Clayton 
Powell, Jr., Charles Diggs, Robert Nix, Sr., Augustus Hawkins, John Conyers, Shirley Chi-
solm, Bill Clay, Louis Stokes, and James Collins. History, Art & Archives, supra. 
283. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 108 (observing that the study indicated that “black officers were not 
as prejudiced as white ones”). 
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windows policing, are negatively correlated with black political representation in 
the city.
284
 Some scholars have argued that statistics such as these represent un-
derpolicing, which results from a lack of concern for black crime victims.
285
 Re-
gardless of the cause, the lower minor-crime arrest rates for blacks in majority-
black political districts would suggest a more nuanced relationship between ag-
gressive police practices and black political leaders.
286
 
Additionally, historical accounts of black police attitudes add important con-
text to Forman’s ﬁndings. For example, in Chicago in 1968, a group of black male 
police officers founded the Afro-American Patrolman’s League (AAPL).
287
 Un-
like most black police organizations, which focused on workplace conditions, 
AAPL acted as a community-based, antiracist entity.
288
 AAPL, led by outspoken 
officer Renault Robinson, engaged in various forms of antiracist activism. The 
organization routinely condemned police brutality by white Chicago police 
against blacks,
289
 and its members frequently intervened to protect blacks who 
were being attacked by white officers.
290
 AAPL also helped blacks prepare com-
plaints alleging police misconduct and offered to ﬁle such complaints with inter-
nal review boards.
291
 AAPL members described their mission as “Black Power 
policing,”
292
 and they frequently clashed with other officers, including blacks, 
who did not share the group’s progressive ideology.
293
 Due to repression and 
harassment from white Chicago police,
294
 the more militant membership of the 
 
284. Elaine B. Sharp, Minority Representation and Order Maintenance Policing: Toward a Contingent 
View, 95 SOC. SCI. Q. 1155 (2014). 
285. See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 1, at 35 (discussing the “central paradox of the African-American 
experience: the simultaneous over-and under-policing of crime”).  
286. I do not wish to discount the real problem of misconduct and negative racial attitudes among 
black police officers. Instead, I contend that this problem is more complex and that when 
compared with white police officers, research suggests important differences, at least in atti-
tudes if not practices. See also infra note 297 (explaining that black police officers’ views of race 
and crime differ substantially from the attitudes of their white colleagues). 
287. See Tera Agyepong, In the Belly of the Beast: Black Policemen Combat Police Brutality in Chicago, 
1968-1983, 98 J. AFR.-AM. HIST. 253 (2013). 
288. Id. at 258-59. 
289. Id. at 259-60, 262. 
290. Id. at 262. 
291. Id. at 261. 
292. Id. at 257. 
293. Id. at 267. 
294. Id. at 266-70, 271-72 (discussing repression of AAPL by Chicago and federal authorities). 
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AAPL dwindled.
295
 Later, the organization evolved into a workplace advocacy 
group.
296
 Nonetheless, the short-lived militancy of the AAPL can supplement 
standard accounts of black police. The AAPL’s nationalism is a rare moment 
within the history of black policing. Nevertheless, examining this group’s advo-
cacy can help scholars to comprehensively analyze the inﬂuence of officer race on 
police conduct and the institutional constraints that limit antiracism among 
black police officers.
297
 
3. Black Prosecutors and Leniency 
Forman’s work also details his frustration with black prosecutors who decline 
to extend leniency to offenders, particularly young individuals or persons with-
out a serious criminal history. As explained above,
298
  prosecutors’ decisions 
shape the destiny of arrestees.
299
 As such, the surge of incarceration in the United 
States can be traced largely to prosecutorial decisions.
300
 The choices of prose-
cutors of any race can determine whether an individual faces incarceration or not. 
 
295. Id. at 271 (“By the 1980s the AAPL’s leadership reﬂected the government’s repression of the 
league’s activities, the ﬁring of the group’s most vocal activists, and the movement of some of 
its leaders to other community activities.”). 
296. Id. (observing that after militant members left the police force, the AALP “began to channel 
most of its energy into making the police department a less hostile work environment for 
black officers” and that “eventually the AAPL abandoned its community activism and rarely 
spoke out about police brutality.”). 
297. Recent polling data suggests a more complicated perspective of contemporary police attitudes. 
Speciﬁcally, black officers have expressed deep concerns over racial inequality and awareness 
and understanding of the strained relationship between police and blacks. Their views of race 
and crime differ substantially from the attitudes of their white colleagues. A 2017 Pew study 
found that ninety-two percent of white police officers believe that “the country has made the 
changes needed to assure equal rights for blacks,” compared to only twenty-nine percent of 
black officers who endorse this statement. Rich Morin et al., Behind the Badge, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/01/11/behind-the-badge [http://
perma.cc/WLG6-2GUY]. White officers also expressed hostility towards activists who pro-
test police misconduct. Only twenty-seven percent of white police officers believed that pro-
tests following police killing of blacks are “motivated at least to some extent by a genuine 
desire to hold police accountable;” sixty-nine percent of black officers, however, think that the 
protestors seek accountability for law enforcement. Id. The Pew study also found that six-in-
ten white and Hispanic officers believe that police have “excellent or good” relations with 
blacks, but only thirty-two percent of black officers hold this view. Id. 
298. See supra text accompanying notes 250-256. 
299. See PFAFF, supra note 3, at 130-34; Davis, supra note 250, at 178-83. 
300. See PFAFF, supra note 3, at 127. 
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Scholars have not widely examined whether the race of prosecutors signiﬁ-
cantly impacts the treatment of black defendants. Some research, however, sug-
gests that as the percentage of black prosecutors increases in a jurisdiction, the 
pervasive disparities between sentences received by black and white defendants 
diminishes. One such study analyzed the impact of racial diversity among 
judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation officers upon sentences 
that black defendants receive.
301
 The study, which examined 51,782 cases during 
a two-year period, found that in at least eighty-nine of ninety-four federal dis-
tricts, as the proportion of black prosecutors relative to the population of blacks 
increased, black defendants were less likely to face incarceration.
302
 The ﬁndings 
in other studies that test the relationship between the race of criminal-justice 
personnel and outcomes for black defendants are mixed.
303
 Nonetheless, this 
empirical research provides additional context for Forman’s observations regard-
ing aggressiveness among black prosecutors. Even if some black prosecutors ex-
ercise their discretion to pursue harsh punishment for black offenders, studies 
suggest that their presence could actually mitigate some of the racial disparities 
associated with sentencing. Examining the possible impact of race on prosecu-
torial decisions could help scholars develop a more comprehensive understand-
ing of the racial dimensions of punitive sentiment. If, as some research indicates, 
race mitigates punitiveness among black prosecutors, then criminal law scholars 
should engage academic literature on race and professional identity in future re-
search. 
4. Black Judges and Leniency 
Although Forman expresses concern about aggressive sentences by black 
judges, the data on whether black judges are equally likely to give harsh sen-
tences as other judges is mixed. As a preliminary matter, judges do not always 
have power during the sentencing process. Indeed, in some cases, judges lack 
discretion regarding sentencing. This was true in the federal system from 1984, 
when Congress created the Federal Sentencing Commission, which promul-
gated the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, until 2005, when the Supreme Court 
 
301. Amy Farrell et al., Race Effects of Representation among Federal Court Workers: Does Black Work-
force Representation Reduce Sentencing Disparities?, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 121 
(2009). 
302. Id. at 131 (“Black defendants are more likely to be sentenced to prison than their white coun-
terparts, even after controlling for legally relevant variables, but when black defendants are 
sentenced in districts with increased representation of black prosecutors, they have a de-
creased likelihood of being imprisoned, which results in more racially equitable sentences.”). 
303. See id. at 124-25 (discussing similar research). 
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held that the guidelines were advisory.
304
 In cases where judges have discretion 
over sentencing, scholars have not compiled sufficient data to make ﬁrm conclu-
sions regarding the effect of a judge’s racial background upon sentencing.
305
 
Some studies validate Forman’s concerns about aggressive sentencing by black 
judges. These studies show that a judge’s racial background has little or no im-
pact upon a decision to incarcerate an individual or the chosen length of the sen-
tence.
306
  Other studies, however, reach different results, ﬁnding that black 
judges are more lenient than white judges towards black offenders.
307
 Further-
more, some of the studies that ﬁnd only a slight correlation between a judge’s 
 
304. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005) (“We answer the question of remedy by 
ﬁnding the provision of the federal sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines manda-
tory . . . incompatible with today’s constitutional holding. We conclude that this provision 
must be severed and excised, as must one other statutory section . . . which depends upon the 
Guidelines’ mandatory nature. So modiﬁed, the federal sentencing statute . . . makes the 
Guidelines effectively advisory. It requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines 
ranges . . . but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as 
well . . . .”). 
305. See Chris W. Bonneau & Heather Marie Rice, Impartial Judges? Race, Institutional Context, and 
U.S. State Supreme Courts, 9 ST. POLS. & POL’Y Q. 381, 382-83 (2009) (discussing disparate 
research results). 
306. See Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-Level 
Judicial Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 85 (2005) (“Despite large, persistent racial dispar-
ities in sentencing, the political, sex, and racial composition of a district’s bench has no general 
effect on the punishment of black and Hispanic offenders.”); Cassia Spohn, The Sentencing 
Decisions of Black and White Judges: Expected and Unexpected Similarities, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
1197, 1211 (1990) (ﬁnding that a judge’s race has very little predictive power with respect to 
sentencing outcomes); Thomas M. Uhlman, Black Elite Decision Making: The Case of Trial 
Judges, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 884, 884 (1978) (ﬁnding only small differences between the sen-
tencing practices of black and white judges). 
307. See, e.g., Susan Welch et al., Do Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 126, 133 
(1988) (ﬁnding that white judges sentence black defendants to more severe sentences than do 
black judges). This study uses the same data as Uhlman, supra note 306, but controls for 
numerous factors that Uhlman neglects, including the defendants’ criminal history, the 
judges’ sex, time spent on the bench, and whether judges had a background as a prosecutor. 
Id. at 130. Welch et al., supra, also analyzed sentencing as a two-step process: the decision to 
incarcerate and the length of sentence. Id. at 128-30. Other studies have also found black 
judges to be more lenient towards black offenders. See Bonneau & Rice, supra note 305, at 396 
(ﬁnding black judges more likely to reverse conviction or sentences in states without inter-
mediate appellate courts); Jon Gottschall, Carter’s Judicial Appointments: The Inﬂuence of Af-
ﬁrmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 165, 
172 (1983) (ﬁnding black federal appeals judges more likely to favor criminal defendants); 
Brian D. Johnson, The Multilevel Context of Criminal Sentencing: Integrating Judge- and County-
Level Inﬂuences, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 259, 290 (2006) (“Minority judges were signiﬁcantly less 
likely than white judges to incarcerate black and Hispanic offenders, but still incarcerated 
them more often than they did white offenders.”). Another study that employed cognitive 
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race and criminal decision making do not dismiss race altogether; instead, the 
impact of race is contextual and based on such factors as the seriousness of the 
crime.
308
 While the body of research on black judges does not permit ﬁrm con-
clusions regarding the role of racial background and judicial decision making, it 
appears that in some instances, blacks’ presence on the bench could possibly have 
mitigated—but by no means eliminated—racial inequities related to sentencing. 
Regardless, the paucity of black judges counsels against assigning to them a sub-
stantial role in the development and enforcement of mass incarceration policies. 
i i i . towards a less punitive criminal justice system 
Forman urges policymakers and reformers to imagine a legal system that re-
places the severe punitive aspects of mass incarceration with mercy.
309
 He rec-
ommends several policy reforms, including expanding the use of pretrial diver-
sion, providing adequate funding for public defenders, eliminating mandatory 
minimum sentences, restoring voting rights for felons, and creating good 
schools in juvenile and adult prisons.
310
 Access to education is Forman’s most 
ambitious advocacy. 
This Part analyzes some barriers to Forman’s reconstructed criminal law and 
enforcement. White racism remains a substantial impediment to a less punitive 
U.S. crime policy. Studies consistently link white punitiveness with racial resent-
ment and antiblack prejudice.
311
 Furthermore, the election of Donald Trump 
and of Republican members of Congress, who are hostile to changes in criminal 
law and enforcement, also hinders federal reform. 
Nonetheless, important avenues for change remain open, including in the 
states, where the vast majority of criminal convictions occur. In the state and 
local context, reform-minded individuals must utilize multidimensional advo-
cacy that involves media strategies, legislative initiatives, litigation, support of 
nonproﬁts that provide social services to ex-offenders and to the families of in-
carcerated individuals, and advocacy of reform to executives—including elected 
 
psychological testing measures of implicit bias found greater leniency among black judges 
toward hypothetical black defendants. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial 
Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1210 (2009). 
308. See, e.g., Schanzenbach, supra note 306, at 89 (“In addition, the proportion of minority judges 
on the bench had some effect on minority sentences. In the case of less serious crimes, having 
a greater proportion of black judges reduced black/white disparities in total sentence and in 
the probabilities of receiving jail time and downward departures.”). 
309. FORMAN, supra note 1, at 217-39. 
310. Id. at 236. 
311. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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prosecutors. Historically, these mobilization strategies have allowed social move-
ments and organized citizenry to effectuate substantial social change—including 
the alteration of legal practices.
312
 
A. States 
In order to attain a meaningful reduction in the level of incarceration in the 
United States, change must occur in state and local governments.
313
 
1. Prosecutors 
In some jurisdictions, voters have signaled intolerance of the status quo. For 
example, in 2016, voters in Cook County, Illinois ousted State Attorney Anita 
Alvarez, who concealed a video showing a Chicago police officer fatally shooting 
a black male who did not appear to threaten officers.
314
 Alvarez, who had a rep-
utation as a heavy-handed prosecutor, also faced widespread criticism for her 
refusal to revisit the cases of inmates who had strong evidence undermining their 
convictions.
315
 In stark contrast, Alvarez’s successor—Kim Foxx—ran on a re-
form agenda
316
 and has implemented changes designed to reduce incarceration 
and restore public trust in policing and prosecutors.
317
 
 
312. See Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 
1235, 1312 (2010) (discussing “multidimensional advocacy” of social movement lawyers, which 
takes place “across legal and political domains”). 
313. About eighty-seven percent of all inmates in the United States are housed in state facilities. 
PFAFF, supra note 3, at 13. 
314. Monica Davey, Prosecutor Criticized over Laquan McDonald Case Is Defeated in Primary, N.Y. 
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Prosecutors in several states have embraced policies that take a more lenient 
approach to criminal law and enforcement. In Florida, for instance, State Attor-
ney Aramis Ayala, the state’s ﬁrst black elected prosecutor, made a policy decision 
never to seek the death penalty.
318
 Ayala’s decision demonstrates the importance 
of local reform strategies, but it also serves as a reminder that backlash can occur. 
After Ayala publicly announced her decision, Florida Governor Rick Scott re-
moved her from twenty-three death-penalty cases.
319
 And recently, Ayala’s office 
decided to pursue the death penalty in a pending prosecution.
320
 It is likely that 
the political backlash to her decision not to seek capital punishment caused her 
to shift positions. Ayala’s experience is a reminder that substantial results do not 
occur rapidly. However, historical and political science research demonstrates 
that long-term multidimensional mobilization strategies can lead to the types of 
structural reforms that Forman advocates. 
2. Legislatures and Governors 
State legislatures and governors have also embraced reform. Some of the 
most punitive states in the nation, including Texas and Louisiana, have adopted 
reforms to their criminal laws with the goal of reducing their prison popula-
tions.
321
 Moreover, in 2016, former Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe issued an 
executive order that restored voting rights to felons.
 322
 Although the Virginia 
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Supreme Court overturned McAuliffe’s original executive order, he later issued a 
narrower order that restored rights to roughly 13,000 ex-offenders.
323
 Substan-
tial political and social barriers to comprehensive reform of criminal law and en-
forcement exist. Nonetheless, recent developments indicate that social move-
ments, policymakers, and academics should continue to view states as 
opportunities for reform. 
3. Overcoming Punitive Sentiment and the Psychology of Racism 
Forman’s vision of criminal law and enforcement will be constrained by the 
intersection of racism and punitiveness. Because punitiveness correlates strongly 
with racial resentment and with psychological categories associated with racial 
inequality, a successful reform effort must address racial prejudice. The psycho-
logical dimensions of racial inequality, however, will prove challenging to over-
come. Studies indicate that implicit bias,
 324
 SDO,
325
 and RWA
326
 exist among 
criminal law professionals. Some jurisdictions have instituted implicit bias train-
ing for court employees,
327
 police officers,
328
 and other actors in the legal system. 
These efforts, however, remain embryonic, and it is unclear how helpful they 
will prove to be in the near future.
329
 Indeed, because bias often operates on the 
unconscious level, potential participants in antibias training might resist or 
question reform.
330
 Furthermore, the relative lack of awareness of and attention 
to SDO and RWA among legal scholars and criminologists means that reformers 
have not begun to propose policies that could minimize the impact of these psy-
chological processes upon criminal law and enforcement outcomes. The strong 
punitive sentiment among high-SDO and RWA individuals, however, suggests 
that minimizing the inﬂuence of these psychological categories must occur be-
fore meaningful reform of U.S. crime policy can take root. 
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B. Federal Government 
Although reform in state practices will have the most meaningful impact on 
the rate of incarceration in the United States, changes in federal policy are not 
unimportant. Nonetheless, the likelihood that the substantive criminal law re-
forms Forman advocates will occur within the federal system in the near future 
are very low. Signiﬁcant barriers to systemic changes in U.S. criminal law and 
enforcement exist within all branches of the federal government. 
1. Presidential Politics 
It is highly unlikely that President Donald Trump will propose any policies 
that would reduce the rate of incarceration in the United States. During his pres-
idential campaign, Trump made appeals to white nationalism and law and or-
der.
331
 He also praised the New York City Police Department’s aggressive “stop 
and frisk” policy,
332
 which had previously been held to violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it was employed in a racially discriminatory fashion—a fact 
that Trump denied during a presidential debate.
333
 Generally, Trump’s positions 
on immigration imply a rigid law-and-order approach. Trump launched his 
campaign with a speech that described Mexican-Americans as “rapists,” and, af-
ter he was elected, he implemented an immigration policy that he once described 
as a “ban” on Muslims entering the United States.
334
 The only notable act of 
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leniency Trump has engaged in was a pardon of former Arizona Sheriff Joseph 
Arpaio, who was convicted of contempt for failing to comply with a federal court 
injunction ordering his department to discontinue unconstitutional racial pro-
ﬁling of Latinos.
335
 Trump’s pardon of Arpaio demonstrates his racial prejudice 
towards persons of color and his tolerance of unlawful police practices. 
2. Department of Justice 
It is also unlikely that the Department of Justice will promulgate policies that 
bring greater leniency to criminal law and enforcement in the near future. Attor-
ney General Jeff Sessions has taken similarly tough law and order stances as Pres-
ident Trump. For example, Sessions ordered a Department of Justice review of 
all consent decrees mandating structural reform of police departments;
336
 he also 
tried, unsuccessfully, to delay enforcement of a consent decree that required sys-
temic reform of the Baltimore police department.
337
 Sessions has stated that 
DOJ’s structural reform of law enforcement agencies interferes with the effec-
tiveness of policing.
338
 Sessions has also instructed federal prosecutors to pursue 
lengthy sentences for drug offenders, and has described drug crimes as “inher-
ently violent.”
339
 These developments indicate that progressive and antiracist 
criminal law reform will not become an aspect of federal executive policy in the 
near future. 
 
335. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Maggie Haberman, Trump Pardons Joe Arpaio, Who Became Face of 
Crackdown on Illegal Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017
/08/25/us/politics/joe-arpaio-trump-pardon-sheriff-arizona.html [http://perma.cc/BT7Y 
-CY2Y]. 
336. Sari Horwitz et al., Sessions Orders Justice Department To Review All Police Reform Agreements, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security 
/sessions-orders-justice-department-to-review-all-police-reform-agreements/2017/04/03
/ba934058-18bd-11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08 [http://perma.cc/43SA-A5Z8]. 
337. Kevin Rector & Luke Broadwater, Judge Denies DOJ Request for Pause in Baltimore Consent De-
cree; Hearing To Proceed as Scheduled Thursday, BALT. SUN (Apr. 5, 2017), http://www 
.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-consent-decree-hearing 
-20170405-story.html [http://perma.cc/EPS6-PVDY]. 
338. Eric Lichtblau, Sessions Indicates Justice Department Will Stop Monitoring Troubled Police  
Agencies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/us/politics/jeff 
-sessions-crime.html [http://perma.cc/B9X5-28LN]. 
339. Joseph Tafani, With Tough Sentencing Policy, Atty. Gen. Sessions Pledges Redoubled War on Drugs, 
L.A. TIMES (May 12, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-essential 
-washington-updates-sessions-drugs-1494603521-htmlstory.html [http://perma.cc/M64A 
-5DK4]. 
examining the social meaning of black punitiveness 
2445 
3. Congress 
The national debate regarding criminal law and enforcement has inﬂuenced 
many members of Congress. In 2010, Congress responded to longstanding crit-
icism of federal sentencing policies by reducing the sentencing disparity between 
crack and powder cocaine.
340
 Broader reform efforts have been unsuccessful de-
spite bipartisan support.
341
 
4. Federal Courts 
Legal scholars are skeptical of the possibility of judicially-mandated reform, 
citing numerous procedural and substantive legal doctrines and policy con-
straints that make courts ineffective sites of structural change; these scholars ad-
vocate instead for democratic reforms.
342
 Although some scholarly critiques of 
judicial reform are legitimate, scholars who advocate democratic reforms of 
criminal law and enforcement often fail to acknowledge the inﬂuence of the po-
litical process upon judicial decisions. A wide body of research demonstrates that 
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federal and state judicial decisions correlate with public opinion, for reasons re-
lated to the involvement of elected officials in the appointment of judges,
343
 ju-
dicial ideology,
344
 public opinion,
 345
 and, in the case of elected judges, campaign 
activities, such as contributions.
346
 The relationship between the political pro-
cess and judicial outcomes warrants continued skepticism regarding the possi-
bility of judicially mandated reform of criminal law and enforcement. 
Despite the multiple barriers to reform of criminal law and enforcement, 
room for optimism exists. Presently, members of Congress, state legislatures, 
and social movement organizations are committed to the creation of policies that 
reduce the incarceration rate. Furthermore, the public has become less punitive 
since the mid-1990s.
347
 If politicians and social movement actors continue to ad-
vocate reform of criminal law and enforcement, courts could become open to 
greater enforcement of civil liberties. 
conclusion 
Forman’s research is challenging, but he has shifted the dialogue on race and 
U.S. crime policy in a better direction. Forman is primarily concerned with 
blacks’ fear of crime and their punitive response. Although Forman recognizes 
the pervasive racism within U.S. criminal law and enforcement, he has chosen 
to give voice to blacks, particularly blacks who are vulnerable to criminal conduct 
because they are locked in poverty. Forman’s attention to their struggle is just as 
important to racial justice as a focus on white supremacy. These discussions, 
however, are not mutually exclusive. 
Using Forman’s powerful work as a point of departure, this Review argues 
that white supremacy could inﬂuence black punitive attitudes. Although many 
blacks Forman analyzes framed their support of punitive measures in racial 
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equality terms, social psychology research tells us to look beneath the surface of 
stated purposes, because implicit bias and psychologically based intergroup dy-
namics arising from SDO and RWA likely  impact human behavior substantially. 
This Review seeks to join a conversation on race and crime made richer by For-
man’s contributions. As the United States continues to reexamine and debate 
punitive policy, it will become more compelling that other scholars enter this 
dialogue as well. 
